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INTRODUCTION 
HE NEW YORK Times, May 10, 1961, addressed an editorial to the 
TU.S. government called, "The Right Not to Be Lied To," which was 
precipitated by the wilful1 falsehoods spread by Administration officials on 
the Cuban invasion fiasco. Despite the well-warranted rebuke of the 
Times, and many public figures, official lying on the nature of U.S. 
involvement in the unhappy affair has persisted. 
It has been our purpose, to the extent of our information and 
experience, to put together the full story of the purpose, execution 
and failure of the invasion carried out under the aegis of the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency, with the approval of two U.S. Presidents. 
To explain the mentality of the invasion's midwife-the CIA-we have 
examined the agency, traced the career of its director Allen W. Dulles 
and publish herewith-for the first time in the U.S., we believe-a Hitler 
SS document covering Dulles' meeting with a Nazi representative in 
1945. A concluding section of our joint effort deals with the dilemmas 
of U.S. foreign policy and suggests ways to peaceful readjustment to a 
changing world. 
It has not been our purpose to evaluate Premier Castro's government; 
neither to list its shortcomings nor to trumpet its achievements. But, 
we frankly profess our belief that the revolutionary government holds 
far more promise for Cuba than any regime the invaders might have 
established. 
We are indebted to Robert Edwards, British Member of Parliament, 
and to his collaborator, Kenneth Dunne, for many of the facts on Allen 
Dulles, which they printed in a booklet, A Study of a Master Spy, pub- 
lished by Housmans, London. 
The extensive files and library of National Guardian newsweekly 
provided much of the material on the Cuban invasion. The impetus for 
this published work grew out of a series published in the Guardian. 
We are in deepest obligation to John T. McManus for wise counsel 
and deft editing. 
ROBERT E. LIGHT 
CARL MAEPZANI 
THE OPPOSING STRATEGISTS 
ALLEN W. DULLES 
Director, 
Central Intelligence Agency, 
United Stabs of America 
FlDEL CASTRO RUZ 
Commander-in-Chief, 
Cuban armed forces, 
Republic of Cuba 
DULLES AND THE CIA 
ERHAPS AS A HEROIC GESTURE in behalf of subordinates, President 
Kennedy has assumed responsibility for the invasion of Cuba April 
17 which ended 66 hours later in total defeat for the invaders. 
It was correct for the President to assume the blame for the resulting 
fiasco, but the responsibility must be apportioned among the agencies 
and men who planned and carried out the action. 
Operation Pluto, the code name for the Cuban invasion (Pluto 
was King of the Underworld in Greek mythology), was conceived under 
the Eisenhower Administration and willed to its successor. President 
Kennedy accepted the inheritance and committed his Administration 
to carrying out the plan. 
Between conception and birth, the operation involved the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, top officials in the State and Defense Departments, UN 
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and the CIA. Whatever reserva- 
tions some may have had, only Fulbright went on record against the 
; adventure-which cost some $45 million of U.S. taxpayers' money, to 
which $15-$20 million may be added by public contribution to indemnify 
Cuba for the damage done, via the tractors for prisoners project ini- 
" tiated by the President a month after the invasion. - 
While all concerned must bear an appropriate share of the responsi- 
. bility, the CIA was the agency most directly implicated. It trained the 
invaders, procured the arms, drew up the invasion plan and presented 
the intelligence estimates on the basis of which the other agencies con- 
curred and participated. Washington made its decisions on what the 
CIA reported. 
In a basic sense, CIA made foreign policy and this (says the New 
Republic, for example) "was the natural end-result of a broad usurpa- 
tion of power which took place, almost unnoticed, during those anoma- 
' lous years when one Dulles ran the State Department and another the 
agency [ e m p h k  added]. . . . Since the death of Foster Dulles this 
usurpation has grown increasingly visible, and Cuba turned a searing 
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spotlight on the phenomenon of a government which has come to have, 
in effect, two State Departments." Perhaps the most important conse- 
quence of the failure of the Cuban invasion is that for the first time 
the American people have had a glimpse of the sinister influence of the 
CIA in foreign policy. 
But this usurpation of power was not only due to the fact that the 
Dulles brothers ran two vital U.S. agencies; it was also due to the fact 
that in the CIA, as Marquis Childs reports, "military influence has long 
been important" and the Pentagon has supported, abetted and protected 
the CIA in its political adventurism. The power of the Pentagon in 
foreign policy is little known to the American people but is beyond dis- 
pute. As long ago as 1950, Walter Lippmann wrote that there was de- 
veloping in the Pentagon "a very good and rather serious imitation of 
what in any other country would be militarism-namely the military 
control of foreign policy." (N. Y. Herald Tribune, June 20, 1950.) Not 
only Lippmann, but John Foster Dulles himself in 1950 attacked the 
Democratic Administration for h e  fact that "the State Department is 
in many respects subordinated to the National Security Council in the ' 
field of foreign affairs. The National Security Council has been pre- 
dominantly military in character." (War or Peace, p. 235.) In the in- 
tervening decade the power of the military has greatly increased; in- 
J 
deed President Eisenhower warned of this trend in his farewell address 
in January, 1961. Yet when the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave written ap- 
proval to the Cuban invasion, they were approving a plan in which 
the Pentagon had participated. The debacle is a comment on the mik- 
tary mind, and this military mind functions also inside the CIA, which 
Marquis Childs says "falls into the error of counting guns and tanks 
as though a census of the number of divisions in being were proof of 
the stability of a country." 
But we must look deeper into the structure of the CIA. Leaving 
aside the morality of invading a sovereign nation in times of peace, 
the sheer massive misrepresentation of intelligence as well as the bum- 
bling inefficiency of execution staggers the irnasination. Here is an 
agency that has tens of thousands of employes and spends hundreds of 
millions of dollars a year (the exact amount being unknown as the 
CIA has no Congressional supervision) and yet can fail so dramatically 
to present a true picture of conditions within a small nation 90 miles from 
our shores-which until Jan. 3, all U.S. citizens might freely visit. 
Where were all those secret agents and spies which the CIA is supposed 
to have all over the world? Did they mislead Washington? 
The answer lies in the nature of an intelligence agency. Contrary 
to popular belief the heart of intelligence work is not the information 
of the super-duper spy, but the systematic gathering of facts which are 
90 per cent obtained from open and legal sources from the country in 
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question: *their magazines, newspapers, academic journals and so on, as 
well as the reports of our embassies with their various attaches, com- 
mercial, military, naval and the rest. Some 200,000 pieces of such 
"open" literature go into the CIA every month and are processed into 
permanent records as an infinity of facts on IBM cards. 
But these Inillions and millions of disparate facts are quite useless 
unless a mind is applied to them, unless somebody thinks with them, 
uses them to develop and check judgments and evaluations. This takes 
a body of experts; and by historical development of intelligence in this 
country, the CIA is not only weak in general on evaluation, but in the 
case of Latin America it happens to be staffed by men trained to be 
cops and not political analysts. The New Republic for May 8, 1961, 
lays bare this hitherto little known aspect of the CIA: 
'When the wartime intelligence groups were disbanded, 
some 1,600 scholars and area experts who had been enlisted 
by the Office of Strategic Services became the nucleus of the 
State Department intelligence organization, while only a hand- 
ful of OSS veterans found their way into the newly formed 
CIA. The CIA had to start from scratch to develop its per- 
sonnel, or to draw on the military and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. In the case of Latin America, the FBI men who 
had been given wartime respousibility for intelligence and 
counter-espionage work in the Western Hemisphere served as 
the core of the CIA regional staff. The Special Intelligence 
Service set up by the FBI for overseas work had performed 
effectively for seven years. But it was one thing to arrest 
enemy espionage agents and quite another to fathom the inner 
social and political workings of Latin American societies. . . . 
The FBI hemisphere organizatiotl was in the end incorporated 
into the CIA more or less intact." 
The reason military men and FBI agents do not make good in- 
telligence experts in the political field is that their training is too rigid 
and narrow. Furthermore, they are usually politically naive and tend 
to see everything in black and white-or should one say, red and white. 
But the decisive factor is not so much their past training as the 
indoctrination they receive in the CIA itself: the atmosphere of the 
agency, which, as in every organization, is a reflection of the director. 
There is an old joke that the key part of an automobile is the nut that 
holds the steering wheel; and this ccmment holds for an intellisence 
agency. The personality and predilections of Allen Dulles are basic to 
the steering of the CIA and to molding its collective personality. 
What kind of a man is Allen Dulles? 
In a long article on the CIA, Newsweek (May 8, 1961), waxes 
ecstatic over Allen Dulles the master-mind: 
"For more than eight years, Dulles has dedicated himself 
to his job, giving it ten or twelve hours a day, expanding and 
improving his staff, developing new facilities and techniques, 
doing his best to make CIA the best intelligence agency in the 
world. And there is no question but that his devotion has 
paid off. French and ~r i t i sh  security officers privately express 
great admiration for CIA. American intelligence officials- 
especially the old timers from OSS days-say what Dulles 
has really given the CIA is professionalism." 
With such admiration for Dulles, two further paragraphs in the 
article are unexpectedly devastating: 
"The CIA was in the news tlGs week because of two de- 
feats. . . . One setback was in Laos, where the CIA decided 
to support the power of General Phoumi Nosavan, mainly 
on the grounds that he was strongly anti-Communist. He was 
-but the CIA entirely overlooked the fact that he was also 
politically unpopular, and his army was aImost entirely worth- 
less. 
"The other humiliation was in Cuba, where the CIA clearly 
failed to grasp the political realities of the situation. The 
CIA believed the information it received from one group of 
Cuban refugees, that the Cuban people were ripe for revolu- 
iton; it discounted the information that said this simply was 
not so." 
Newsweek calls this "astonishing ineptitude" and goes on to analyze 
why: 
"The basic reason is that the GIA tendency to support the 
most militant anti-Communist is built into the system. . . . 
When a CIA man goes abroad, the emphasis is on getting 
intelligence, especially about what the Communists are doing, 
and the best way to find out about the Reds is to establish 
contact with the national secret police. . . . 'The result is that 
the system tends to make the U.S. clandestine allies of reac- 
tion,' says a former CIA man who now holds elective office." 
Militant anti-Communism is Newsweek's reason for the CIA inepti- 
tude, a blind, self-defeating anti-Communism. But this political position - 
is not the result of co-operating with reactionary secret police throughout 
the world. Such co-operation is the result and not the cause of CIA's 
blindness. A more accurate reason is given by Marquis Childs in the : 
Washington Post (April 26, 1961) in what he calls the CIA's "exile men- 
tality.= He writes: 
"Ever since the Russian revolution of 1917 and increasingly 
in the past two decades exiles have influenced American policy 
and the American appraisal of critical situations. . . . But by the 
very terms of exile they are more likely than not to be wrong 
in their estimates of what is happening in their former home- 
lands ." 
But in a sense this reason begs the question: Why should U.S. policy 
makers be influenced by exiles? It  is, after all, well known that exiles 
are rarely objective about q d i t i o n s  in their former countries: Chiang 
Kai-shek is not the best expert on China, and reactionary governments 
are out of touch with their own people-that's what makes them reac- 
tionary. 
Naturally such people will give biased and misleading inforrnation. 
Commander Lederer, one of the authors of The Ugly American, has 
shown in his recent book, A Nation of Sheep, how U.S. intelligence and 
diplomats are systematically gulled by the reactionaries' regimes through- 
out Scutheast Asia. Lederer gives specific instances where these regimes 
prevent U.S. agents from going into ihe field, a not too difficult job of 
persuasion since U.S. agents generally do not know the language and are 
reluctant to leave the easy life of the big cities. 
Above all, however, these agents also know that the home office looks 
with suspicion on reports that seem "soft" on communism. In the strug- 
gle between the Chinese Red Army and the Kuomintang, American 
officials in China were afraid to report the objective situation. Time-Life 
correspondent Jack Belden in China Shakes the World gives many in- 
stances of this fear. Neuxweek unwittingly confirms this phenomenon 
quoting the former CIA man as saying: 'When it comes to recommenda- 
tions about politics, the safe project is to support the element which is 
most anti-Communist." 
In other words, the political bias of the top CIA officials, their blind 
antiCommunism, is the basic reason for CIA ineptitude. The intel- 
lectual climate of the agency is shaped by these officials and primarily 
by the director himself. Dulles himself has said, "You have to look to 
the man who is directing the organization and the result he achieved. 
If you haven't got someone who can be trusted, or who doesn't get re- 
sults, you'd better throw him out and get some one else." 
This is sound advice and will probably be prophetic. It is doubtful 
that Allen Dulies will last through 1961 as director of the CIA. But 
when he is gone it may be hoped that he will not be forgotten, for his 
life and mentality are typical of many top policy makers in om govern- 
ment, partic~~larly the ease with which such men shuttle fro= lucrative 
corporate positions to high government posts and back again. Much of 
Allen Dulles' background is unknown to the American people. A quick 
look at his personal history will illuminate both the CIA and U.S. foreign d'yl 
- 
policy in the last dedade. 
Allen Dulles was born on April 7, 1893. As a *future diplomat and 
intelligence official he had picked his relatives carefully. His maternal 
grandfather, General John Watson Foster, was Secretary of State in the 
Hamson administration [1890-941, and busied himself to annex the 
Hawaiian Islands. His uncle, Robert Lansing, became Wilson's Secretary 
of State in August, 1915. Thanks to his abilities and his family connec- 
tions, Allen Dulles becam& a second secretary in Vienna in 1916 at the 
age of 23. From Vienna he went to Switzerland and later to the Paris - 
Peace Conference in 1919. His admirers say he showed great talents in 
those years. Time magazine in September, 1959, wrote that in Switzer- 
land in 1918 X d e s  hatched the first of the grandiose plots which were 
to become his trademark.'' Grandiose seems to be the mot iuste: Dulles' 
plot aim& at saving the Hapsburg empire by turning it into a kind of 
United States of Austria. Events didn't quite turn out that way-and as 
a matter of history, the hallmark of futility has remained with Allen + 
Dubs right through to the Cuban enterprise. 
A year later, at the Paris Peace Conference, we find Dulles terribly -; 
impressed by anti-Bolshevik emigres. He wrote a memorandum entitled ; 
"Lithuania and Poland, the Last Bamer Between Germany and the Bol- 
sheviks." The memorandum is strongly in favor of Polish-Lithuanian - 
intervention and T h e  Allies should not be deterred from a military ex- - 
pedition because of their fear that it would require hundreds of thou- . A; 
sands of men." Allen Dulles was only twenty-five and a half years old, 
but already he was thinking- big. 
Allen Dulles' superior at this time was a Mr. Ellis Dressel who was 
the leading U.S. expert on German affairs. When Dressel went to Ber- 
lin in 1919 as U.S. Charge d'maires, Dulles was with him as first secre- 
tary. Dressel had many contacts with the generals and financiers who 
were dreaming of a future push to the East. One of the Dressel reports 
makes interesting reading. He talked to a leading financier who told him 
that the nations destined to bring order to Russia were undoubtedly 
Germany -and America. America co~~ld  not cope with this task alone 
because she did not understand conditions in Russia whereas Germany 
had the necessary experience. Dulles' top level German contacts date 
from this time. 
After Berlin, DuUes spent two years in Constantinople and then re- 
turned to Washington where he became head of the ~ivision for Near 
East &airs until he left in 19%. Near East means oil and during this 
period the battle between American and British oil companies took plaw- . 
with Rockefeller finally getting 25 per cent of the shares of Iraq Petro- 
leum Co., Mellon's group of the Gulf Oil Corporation getting priority 
rights on the Bahrein Islands.- 
In 1926 Dulles resigned from the State Department for a post in the 
powerful legal firm of Sullivan and Cromwell which had ties and deal- 
ings with Rockefeller and Morgan among other American corporations. 
Dulles' knowledge of oil stood him in good stead as evidenced quickly 
by the affair of the so-called "Barco Concession" in the oil fields of Co- 
lombia. 
In 1917 a certain General Barco had sold a .group of American firms 
(including Morgan and Mellon) a concession on the rich oilfields in the 
province Norte de Santander, but in 1926 the Colombian President, Dr. 
Miguel Abadia hfendez, denounced the concession. The Morgan-Mellon 
group chose two experts on the art of putting pressure, both former 
State Department officials-Allen Dulles and Francis Loomis. Other ad- 
visers were Gerrard Winston, former assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
and Herbert Stadler, former head of the Latin American Division of the 
State Department. 
By 1928 Secretary of State Kellogg had sent an ultimatum and the 
Mellons threatened an economic boycott. But President Mendez re- 
mained firm. However by 19S0, with a little financial push from the U.S. 
oil companies, a new president was elected in Colombia who forced a 
new oil bill through the Colombia Congress. The operation was a 
success. 
Among the major customers of Sullivan and Cromwell were three 
German firms, Vereinigte Stahlwerke ( the famous steel trust), I. G. Far- 
ben and Bosch. Bosch had an American subsidiary which at the begin- 
ning of World War I1 was turned over to the Swedish bankers, Wallcn- 
berg Brothers, to be returned at the end of the war. The Dulles brothers 
handled the transaction in the United States. By this time Allen Dulles 
had become a director of the German-international J. Henry Schroeder 
Banking Corporation in the United States. The head of the German 
parent outfit, Schroeder Bankhaus, was a genuine German baron, Kurt 
von Schroeder, whose house in Cologne was ihe rendezvous for the 
famous meeting of Hitler and Franz von Papen in January, 1933. The 
Baron later became an SS Gruwenfuehrer and chairman of a group 
that collected funds to finance Himmler. 
Because of his German contacts, Allen Dulles became head of the 
Berne office of the OSS during the Second World War. His work is still 
shrouded in secrecy but here and there a glimpse is available. A British 
Member of Parliament, Mr. Robert Edwards, has obtained and published 
documents from the files of the SS Reich Security Office of conversations 
held between Dulles and a high SS official in February, 1943. The cover 
name for Dulles was Mr. Bull. The SS official's cover name was Pauls. 
Here are excerpts from the SS reports published by the Hon. Mr. Ed- 
wards : 
"He (Dulles) received Herr Pauls very cordially, and the 
two established that they had already met in 1916 in Vienna 
and between 1923 and -- in New York. Mr. Bull (Dulles) 
said he was very glad to see Mr. Pauls again after all this time 
and exchange ideas with him, as he had a clear head for Euro- 
pean problems; he (Dulles) was fed up with listening all the 
time to outdated politicians, emigres and prejudiced Jews. In 
his ( Dulles ) view, a peace had to be made in Europe in the 
preservation of which all coi~cemed would have a real interest. 
There must not again be a division into victors and vanquished, 
that is, contented and discontented; never again must nations 
like Germany be driven by want and injustice to desperate ex- 
periments and heroism. The German state must continue to 
exist, as a factor of order and progress; there could be no ques- 
tion of its partition or the separation of Austria. . . . To the 
Czech question Mr. Bull ( Dulles ) seemed to attach little im- 
portance; at the same time he felt it necessary to support the 
formation of B cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism and pan- 
Slavism through the eastward enlargemen! of Poland and the 
preservation of Rumania and of a strong Hungary." 
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"Then Mr. Bull (Dulles) turned to the subject of National 
Socialism and the person of Adolph Hitler and declared that 
with all respect to the historical importance of Adolph Hitler 
and his work it was hardly conceivable that the Anglo-Saxons2 
worked-up public opinion -could accept Hitler as unghallenged 
master of Greater Germanv. Peo~le  had no confidence in the 
durability and dependabil6 of a&eements with him. And re- 
establishment of mutual confidence was the most essential thing: 
after the war. Nevertheless, Herr Pauls did not get the impre; 
sion that it was to be viewed as a dogma of American prejudice. 
Mr. Bull (Dulles) described the Atlantic Charter as an impor- 
tant basis; but its excessively wide compass needed to b e  re- 
vised." 
The hint of anti-Semitism contained in the first excerpt was mc 
sharply enunciated in two other passages which follow. 
"Herr Pauls now made a very sharp thrust on the Jewish 
question and declared that any Central European would find it 
unbearable to think the Jews might ever come back again; 
people would simply not accept a return of the Jews and a re- 
establishment of their position of power. Herr Pauls intimated 
that he sometimes actually felt the Americans were only going 
on with the war so as to be able to get rid of the Jews and send 
them back again. To this Mr. Bull ( Dulles ) who in the course 
of the conversation had clearly evinced anti-Semitic tendencies, 
replied that in America things had not quite got to that point 
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yet and that it was in general a question of whether the Jews 
wanted to go back." 
0 4 4 
"Mr. Bull (Dulles) is in close touch with the Vatican. He 
himself called Herr Pauls' attention to the importance of this 
connection, for the American Catholics also have a decisive word 
to say, and before the conversation ended he again repeated 
how greatly Germany's position in America would be strenL@- 
ened if German bishops were to plead Germauy's cause there. 
Even the Jews' hatred could not overweigh that. It had to be 
remembered, after all, that it had been the American Catholics 
who had forced the Jewish-American papers to stop their baiting 
f Franco Spain." - . -- - 
I - .  
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e cannot assume that Dulles is as virulently anti-Semitic as his' 
Nazi counterpart, Herr Pauls-after all he was trying to be pleasant to a 
Nazi-but even for this purpose he seems unnecessarily enthusiastic. More 
important, however, is that at a time when the Casablanca Conference 
had set a Big Three. allied agreement of '"unconditional surrender" Dulles 
is suggesting that Austria not be liberated and that a strong Germany 
be pa% of a new cordon sanitaire against the USSR. 
Moreover this conversation in February, 1943, must be seen in the con- 
text of the times. The German defeat at Stalingrad in January, 1943, was 
seeiwby all military strategists as the turning point of the war. Hence- 
forth the USSR could not be defeated and therefore a German defeat 
was inevitable unless the Allies could be split. The more far-sighted 
Nazis recognized this and from the memoirs of such Nazi intelligence 
agents as Gisevius and Hottl we know that Himmler at about this time 
was looking for contacts with the West for a deal to remove Hitler, 
cede the occupied territory in the West and continue the war in the East. 
Dulles supplied this contact and was actually being used by Himrnler 
perhaps without his knowing it. - (Incidentally the Nazi agents have re- 
vealed that the Hungarian deciphering office had broken the code that 
Dulles used to comn~unicate with Washington.) 
There was no alternative to the agreed policy of '"unconditional sur- 
render" except on the political premise of anti-Sovietism. This was 
clearly understood by all concerned including the Vatican, which was 
to have its finger in the generals' plot against Hitler the following year. 
That Dulles favored this plan is shown by the fact that two years later, 
in February, 1945, he was involved in secret negotiations for the sur- 
render of Nazi troops in Italy, excluding the Russians who had a right 
to participate and thus precipitating one of the few angry exchanges 
between Stalin and FDR. 
The full story of what Dulles' contacts with the Nazis actually 
achieved is still shrouded in secrecy, but if they were as praiseworthy 
as has been hinted it is a-reasonable supposition that more details would 
be available-for Dulles is not unaware of public relations methods. 
From what little has been garnered here these contacts seem to show 
the typical Dulles' hallmark of grandiose (and futile) schemes of which - 
the Cuban invasioil has become the most notorious. 
Despite Dulles' protestations to the contrary, the CIA under his direc- 
tion has consistently edged into foreign policy and has acted again and 
again as if it were a government super-imposed on s government. It has- 
been published and never denied that the CIA has subverted govern- 
ment after government, not stopping-at the use of military force. The 
CIA role in overthrowing the Mossadegh government in Iran and the 
Arbenz government in Guatemala has been underlined in i n n ~ e r a b l e  
publications. A Saturday Evening P ~ s t  article over four vears ago de- . 
clared that CIA agents had worked wiih Naguib and ~ a s s i r  in the over-. 
throw of King Farouk in 1952 and the responsible British N e w  ~tatemw&' 
(May 12, 1961) flatly asserted that the CIA "disposed of Patrice Lu&-' 
mumba." There are persistsnt reports in France that CIA agents wen&: 
involved in the generals' abortive revolt in Algeria. There are 
grounds for believing the CIA supported Chiang Kai-shek's defea 
troops which retreated to Burma and set up bases there for hit-and--.' 
raids on China. This led to serious friction between the U.S. and Burma.. 
Says the New York Times ( May 23, 1961 ) : 
T h e  Chinese Nationalist operations which were unsuccess- ,; : 
ful against Communist China ended in an exacerbation of rela- 
tions between Burma and the United States. In 1953, 7,000 
Chinese Nationalists were taken out by air to Taiwan (by the 
U.S.) and it appeared that the episode was over." 
But the tenacity of the CIA, md their flouting of official U.S. policy, . 
is shown in the same Times article by the fact that at Geneva in May, . 
1961, Secretary of State Rusk had to assure the Burmese that the U.S. 
was not responsible for "the recent renewal of Chinese Nationalist ac- 
tivity in Burma and that the Central Intelligence Agency had not been 
involved in it. The history of Chinese Nationalist operations in B 
however, have kept Burmese suspicions alive." 
l'he Thnes proceeds to give some details of why the Burmese are 
not satisfied: 
"Burmese Army patrols last October [I9601 discovered an 
airstrip in Shan State. maintained by Chinese Nationalists. Air- - - 
drops were being made by unmarked transport planes. [This 
a favorite CIA device.] One of the transports was engaged by 
' 
a Burmese fighter plane. The fighter plane was shot down by 
the transport and the pilot killed." 
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All this has come out because at the Geneva conference on Laos, 
the Communist delegate charged that Chiang's troops were being used 
in Laos and the Burmese Foreign Minister,-though friendly to the U.S., 
felt compelled to tell the conference : 
"Past experience warns us that these marauders, unless 
withdrawn from Laos, are likely to infiltrate into Bunnese terri- 
tory again while we are engaged in mopping up the small num- 
bers still remaining on our soil.'' 
U7ith masterly understatement the Times dispatch says: 
"The Burmese Foreign Minister indicated that his neutral 
country was not entirely satisfied with assurances he received 
privately from Secretary of State Dean Rusk . . . that Chinese 
Nationalists would not be allowed to infiitrate back into Burma 
from Laos." 
It is a commentary on the influence of CIA on foreign policy that a 
U.S. Secretary of State is not believed by the Foreign Minister of a 
friendly neutral country. How disastrous to U.S. prestige irresponsible 
CIA actions can be was, of course, dramatically shown by the U-2 flight 
before the summit conference of May, 1960. President Eisenhower took 
full responsibility for that disaster, just as Kennedy did for Cuba, al- 
though as Newsweek stated on May 8, 1961, "most of official Washington 
still believes that Mr. Eisenhower didn't lcnow beforehandtabout the last, 
tragic U-2 mission." 
The CIA sees as "Commuiiism" the slightest attempt at social reform 
by any government and proceeds to subvert such government. If un- 
successful, the intervention pushes those governments further left, as in 
the case of Iraq and Cuba; where successful, as in the case of Mossadegh 
in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala, it ultimately strengthens the pressures 
for revolutionary solutions. 
Enough details have come out on the Cuban fiasco so that citizens 
can see for themselves what the CIA has been doing and how far its 
actions square with existing l a ~ s  or accepted morals in our country. 
We can also see to what extent CIA policy is the result of a blind ad- 
herence to the status quo which puts U.S. foreign policy at variance 
with a world in change. There is an inescapable symbolism between 
Allen Dulles, chief instigator of the invasion and Fidel Castro who led 
the defending forces. Dulles is 68, Castro half his age. Dulles won his 
first spurs trying to save the Hapsburg Empire-in a world that had no 
Soviet Union, no atom bombs, no African liberation struggles; a world 
where China was a geographical expression, the United States a rising 
power protected by ocean distances, and world politics settled in a hand- 
ful of capitals in tiny Europe. 
Castro grew up in a world of cataclysmic change, a teen ager when 
World War I1 was going on, a student when the atom bomb was 
dropped on Hiroshima. 
For Dulles the Russian Revolution was a traumatic experience, the 
terrifying eruption of the lower depths as seen through the eyes of bitter 
emigres. The Soviet Union was a patchwdrk of a state that couldn't 
possibly last, Marxism the Devil's own dogma and Lenin a conspiratorial 
agent probably paid by the Germans to take Russia'out of the war. 
Castro saw correctly that a new social structure built on wholesale - 
agrarian reform was the only hope for politico-economic independence 
for his country-and indeed for the whole of Latin America. When the 
U.S. reacted imperialistically to hi; aims, he turned toward the Soviet 
Union, which he respected as the leading world power in a victorious 
alliance against Fascism. He saw in Marxism a stimulating philosophy - 
in vigorous competition with other philosophies, and regarded Lenin as 
a great historical figure. t 
In the last decade while the sedentary Dulles in his sixties shuffled 
papers on his desk and spun schemes to stem the rising tide of social-: 
change the free-wheeling Fidel in his twenties was fighting gun in hand to 
free his country from the oppression of the U.S.-supported Batista. As the 
aging Dulles sat at his desk waiting to hear reports from the long-feared 
invasion, the vigorous Castro, in the prime of his life, was shooting from ' 
a tank and sinking an ammunition ship chartered by the CIA. Two 
worlds stood face to face, two epochs, and the answer was in doubt only -- 
for Dulles. 
I 
from Vie Nuove, Rome 
"I'M be+ h.ers a CIA man." 
from Revolucion, Haba.na 
We want Peace -and to be left in  peace. 
MADE IN U.S.A.: the counter-revolutionaries' arsenal. I 
INTEHVENTION - YANKEE STYLE 
IN THE EARLY HOURS of April 17, a fleet of cargo ships; converted fishing 
boats and onetime sub chasers dropped anchor off Bahia de Cochinos 
(Bay of Pigs), on the south shore of Cuba 90 miles southeast of Havana. 
At 3 a.m. the fist of some 1,500 to 1,700 Cubans scrambled ashore from 
self-exile to try to overthrow the Revolution won Jan. 1, 1959. 
The invaders wore U.S.-made camouflage uniforms with cap devices 
reading, "God, Fatherland and Liberty." They were armed with some 
2,500 tons of supplies, including five tanks, ten armored cars, 18 anti-tank 
guns, recoilless rifles, 70 bazookas, rocket and flame throwers, 30 mortars, 
sub-machine guns, heavy machine guns, rifles and knives. 
They landed at Playa Larga (Long Beach) at the bottom of the bay 
and at Giron Beach at its mouth. Some 175 paratroopers dropped 
inland. The bay is in the Cienaga de Zapata, a vast thicketed swamp- 
land, which lies between the mainland of Cuba and a small strip of solid 
land along the coast. Two newly-built roads lead inland. 
From the Caribbean, Radio Swan Island broadcast in the name of 
Jose Miro Cardona, president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council: 
"Before dawn, Cuban patriots in the cities and in the hills 
began the battle to liberate our homeland from the despotic rule 
of Fidel Cas tro." 
The "'liberators" on the beaches did their best. They moved 20 miles 
inland, overrunning handfuls of local militia, many of whom were teen 
agers from the cities teaching peasants to read and write. 
But even as the invaders were landing, a call from five militiamen 
guarding Playa Larga, "they're here," alerted Cuban defense forces. By 
dawn the six planes that constituted the Cuban air force-two British- 
made Sea Furies, two US.-made jet trainers and two U.S.-made B-26s- 
attacked the supply ships and landing craft. Five vessels were sunk, 
including the Rio Escondido which carried about 30,000 gallons of avia- 
tion gas as well as tank shells and anti-tank mines, and the Houston 
with tons of communications equipment and one battalion of troops. 
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Infantry battalions from Cienfuegos, Matanzas and Cavadonga, as 
well as a militia battalion from Matanzas, moved against the invaders. . 
Artillery and tank units followed. From Havana, Premier Castro came 
to take command. 
The Cuban planes hammered at the supply ships around the clock. 
The counter-revolutionaries' propeller-driven B-26s were no match for the 
Cuban jets. They conceded the skies over the sea and beach and con- 
centrated, on strafing the Cuban defenders. On the ground, Castro did 
rected his tanks and artillery against the flanks; infantry moved against . 
the center. The defenders fought eEciently andwith fury. 
By April 19 the invaders were hi full rout. Many fled into the 
swamps. Others ran back to the beaches looking for evacmtion boats, 
but for most there was no escape. 
Manuel Penabaz, one who escaped, described the scene 
" ~ l & c i n ~  back we saw the entire battalion fleeing in p 
wildly toward the sea and then, when the shells rained down on 
beach, back toward the road, and then back toward the sea." 
On April 19, "~o&uni~ue No. 4" was issued from the battlefie 
signed by Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief." It said: 
, . 
T h e  invading mercenary army which occupied C 
tory for less than 72 hours has been completely crushed. 
T h e  Revolution has emerged victorious 
high toll in courageous lives of fi&ters who 
- "A part af the mercenaries sought to 
sea in a number of boats which were sunk by the re 
air forces. 
+ "The remainder of the mercenary forces s 
casualties, dispersing in a swamp area from 
is possible. 
"A large quantity of arms of American manufacture was cap- 
tured, including several Sherman tanks." 
Cedric Belfrage reported in Nutiowl Guardian on visiting the battle . ' 
field April 20: 
"All the way down the road to Playa Giron, tired, dirty, tri- 
umphant militiamen greeted us. . . . In the ditches lay the debris 
of a two and one-half-day war. Militiamen who'd come from ' 
Havana spoke of their disappointment at arriving too late to 
fight. Nothing remained to do except bring in the groups of in- 
vaders who kept emerging from the thickets of the swamp, 
burning with thirst, clothes and bodies tom, desperate to sur- 
render. . . . 
"It was clear that a similar defense could have and would , 
have been mounted anywhere in Cuba, using mostly the forces -- 
in the locality. There was never even time to bring into play . - 
the major forces. Wlien word of the landing reached Jaguey, 
its people stormed the armory for weapons. An old man wept 
because none were left for him." 
A final count of captured counter-revolutionaries ran to 1,214. Many 
were sons of landlords and other property holders who lost their assets 
under the revolution. Some were former army and police officers in 
Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship. A few were "'idealists," adventurers 
and opportunists. 
Under questioning they told like tales. They did not expect to meet 
resistance. They were told that Cubans were suffering under Castro, 
who had allowed Russians to overrun the country. cuban soldiers and 
militiamen, they were led to believe, would throw down their arms and 
join the counter-revolution. In the cities there were to be mass upris- 
ings and a general strike. 
The invaders also expected that a 15,000-man inter-American army 
would reinforce them on the beachhead. U.S. planes were to protect 
them overhead. 
For some of the invaders counter-revolution was a patriotic duty. B- To others it was to be a lark. As the prisoners mused over their fate, 
they also wondered what went wrong. 
The story of how and why the invaders got to Cuba and and 
why they were manipulated and deceived is both sordid and alarming. 
 he plan was written in Washington and the plot developed in Florida, 
Louisiana and Texas and in Guatemala, Panama, Puerto Rico and 
Nicaragua. The authors are U.S. political and military leaders, in both 
Their purpose was imperialist; their technique in character. The 
casualties of their folly were fortunately light. But the sortie camp 
dangerously close to setting off a world-&de holocaust. 
WHO MADE THE DECISION? 
When Fidel Castro visited the U.S. in April, 1959-three months after 
the success of the 26th of July Revolution-Washington had not yet set 
an official attitude toward Cuba. Some saw threats to U.S. investments 
in the Revolution's promises of agrarian reform, an end to unemployment, 
redistribution of income and affirmation of the sovereignty of the nation. 
They wanted open expression of U.S. displeasure of the Revolution, or, 
at most, icy acceptance. 
Others in Washington argued that Castro's promises were standard 
pap to lull the Cuban populace. They recalled that Batista and other 
Latin Arnerican dictators also came t o  power on promises of reform. 
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When the furor died down, they said, Castro would be like the rest. 
U.S. business interests would be protected. 
Eisenhower played it safe. He found it expedient to be out of town 
when Castro arrived. The State Department did not officially receive the 
Cuban Premier on the grounds that his was not an official visit. 
But Vice President Nixon spent three hours with him, listening to his 
plans (then still unimplemented) for Cuba. 
Nixon prepared a three-page memorandum for Eisenhower and other 
leaders in which he argued that Castro was a captive of communists 
and perhaps even more dangerous than orthodox Marxists. He urged that 
a force of Cuban exiles should be trained to overthrow Castro. 
The Eisenhower Administration mulled over the issue for some 
months. By the end of the year-after the agrarian reform and other 
measures were instituted i6 Cuba-Nixon's view prevailed. The National 
Security Council directed @e CIA to prepare a "Guatemala Solutiony' 
for Cuba. The CIA was instructed to promote disaffections, organize 
exiles, train a military force and plan an invasion. 
The operation was in full swing by the spring of 1960; the invasion 
targetted for November. After the Democratic convention in July, Dulles 
flew to Hyannis Port, Mass., to brief candidate Kennedy. (Interestingly, 
during the election campaign Kennedy called for full U.S. support to 
Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro. Nixon, instigator of the plan, was 
forced to argue against the dangers of unilateral action.) 
After the election, Eisenhower thought it proper to check with 
President-elect Kennedy before instituting the invasion. Kennedy "seemed 
taken aback," Drew Pearson reported. But, Pearson added, "he did not 3 
say anything against going ahead." Whatever misgivings Kennedy had, 
Eisenhower thought them sdicient to delay the invasion for execution 
by the new administration. 
President Kennedy's fist announcement, the day after election, was 
the reappointment of Dulles as CIA director. He assigned his own 
"task force" to reexamine and reevaluate the Cuba invasion plans. He 
asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the military aspects. 
Chalrner M. Roberts reported in the Washington Post (May 14) : 
"Months ago some additional Pentagon officers were assigned to work a 
on the project. When the plans were worked out, they were subject 
to review by a military committee of the Pentagon's Joint Staff, the top 
' 
ranking military group under the Joint Chiefs. 
When the, plans were presented to the President after he came into 
office it was no cursory affair. The meeting room was surrounded with I 
maps showing the beaches and landing places, diagrams to show the 
methods of landing and the logistic preparations. 
"Finally . . . the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman 
L. Lendnitzer, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke, 
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gave the President a written, signed opinion that the operation made 
sense militarily." 
Late in January, Kennedy began meeting weekly with top CIA, 
State and Defense Department officials and key aides. Opinions were 
also sought from Administration figures, including UN -~mbassador 
Adlai Stevenson and Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. The invasion plan was greeted with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. The CIA and the Pentagon promoted 
it as their own offspring. But others were concerned with world reaction. 
James Reston reported in the New York Times (April 11) : "The 
State Department is worried about the political and- military con- 
sequences in the hemisphere and elsewhere of providing military force 
to achieve political ends." He pointed out that Article 15 of the Charter 
of the Organization of American States "specifically forbids such action." 
The Article reads: "No state or group of states has the right to inter- 
- - 
vene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits 
not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted 
threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic 
and cultural elements." 
Only Fulbright argued that invasion plans were wrong morally. He 
wrote a long memorandum to President Kennedy in March, arguing 
that Castro is "a thorn in our flesh, but he is not a dagger in our hearts." 
Some argued that other Latin Americans might interpret the invasion 
as a U.S.. move to restore a dictatorship and end economic reforms. 
Consequently, President Kennedy ordered the State Department to 
publish a white paper on U.S. policy drafted principally by special 
assistant Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 
It appealed to Castro to "return to the original purposes which 
brought so many gallant men together in the Sierra Maestra and to 
restore the integrity of the Cuban revolution." 
The White Paper accused the Castro government of "betraying their 
own rev~lution,~' but it also denonnced Batista. It admitted past U.S. 
"omissions and errors" in relations with Batista and acknowledged the 
progress of the Revolution in building schools, houses and medical 
clinics as well as "the early projects of land reform." It added, 
"no future Cuban government can expect to turn its back on such 
objectives." 
As a further step to show Washington's concern for a "democratic" 
new Cuba, President Kennedy ordered the exiles' military training 
camps purged of former Batista men. 
In March the CIA pushed hard for a.  go-ahead signal. It argued 
that Castro was growing steadily stronger militarily. About 1.00 Cubans, 
CIA officials said, were in Czechoslov~kia learning to fly Soviet-made 
L 
I 
MIG jets; they would return soon with planes. (This has never been 
confirmed by Cuba, Czechoslovakia or neutral sources. ) 
CIA officials also pointed out that the Cuban underground was fast 
being discovered and suppressed. Jules Dubois reported in the Chicago 
Tribune (April 25) that "the underground inside Cuba suffered its 
worst setback on March 17 when most of its top leaders were arrested i 
. . . while holding a meeting in Havana." Among those arrested and 
later executed were Maj. Humberto Sorin and Rogelio Gonzalez Corzo, 
whom Dubois described as "Mr. Underground." 
Counterrevolutionaries were at the peak of training, the CIA argued, 
and they were getting restless. 
But the CIA'S most telling argument was that Guatemalan President 
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes had asked that the exiles be removed from , 
training camps in his country by June 1. Ydigoras was under considerable 
pressure at home because of the camps. He had continually denied 
in public that the bases existed, but by now they were an open secret. 
He could not fight the pressure much longer. 
President Kennedy's time for decision came the first week in April. 
Newsweek (May 1) described the scene in the Cabinet Room of tha 
VVhite House thus: 
"Assembled around the octagonal table were President Kennedy, 
CIA director Allen W. Dulles; his deputy Gen. C. P. Cabell; the CIA 
deputy director for plans, Hichard Bissell; Defense Secretary Robert - 
McNamara; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman L. 
Lemnitzer; the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke; Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk; Assistant Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann;. 
the chief of the Administration's special Latin America task force, 
Adolph Berle; and the President's Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, McGeorge Bundy . 
"It was the tenth time in ten weeks that these same officials- 
in effect, the National Security Council augmented-had met to consider 
the Cuban plan. Now, in this'last dramatic meeting, the President asked 
each man, in turn, the critical question. Not one voiced opposition." 
President Kennedy signalled the green light. But he set some 1 
restrictions on the invasion plan. He insisted that no U.S. nationals 1 
could be directly involved in the landings and that the invaders could 
not jw.i~p off from U.S. soil. 
The original plan had called for air cover from U.S. Navy planes, 
but the President vetoed this. A revised plan, according to Newsuxek, 
provided for an air strike by U.S. planes before the invasion boats 
went in. me President also canceled this, at the last moment. 
On advice from Rusk, Stevenson and Bowles, President Kennedy 
ruled out proposals for pre-invasion radio appeals to Cuba callink 
for an insurrection and for showering the country with leaflets. 
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The first phase of the invasion began April 15. Four days later, 
while the invaders' commander Capt. San Roman was running about 
the beach shouting, "Every man for himself," the Washington planners 
held their heads in anxiety over what went wrong. 
At first, the U.S. officials reacted as if San Roman's words were 
aimed at them. Each struggled to evacuate himself from the disaster. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff leaked a story that they had not drawn up the 
military plan. But Defense Secretary McNarnara went out of his way 
at a news conference to confirm the Pentagon's role. 
James Reston reported in the New York Times that Rusk and Bowles 
had advised against the plan. According to Newsweek, President Kennedy 
"called Rusk and blisteringly reminded him that he had not offered 
such advice at the time." 
Newsweek further said that "Bowles was handled by Brother Bobby 
[Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy], who in a personal confrontation jabbed 
his finger at the Under Secretary's chest and said: 'I understand you 
advised against this operation. Well, let me tell you something as of 
right now. You did not. You were for it.'" (Drew Pearson reported 
that Bowles had drawn up a memo advising against the invasion, 
but, Pearson said, there was no evidence that he had sent it.) 
At a briefing for newsmen, the CIA said flatly that its intelligence 
estimates had been correct. Scapegoats would have to be sbught 
elsewhere. 
With all the cover-up, only Stevenson remained exposed, unable 
to hide the naive tales he had told at the UN. Although his part in the 
planning was small, he had had to tell the world that the U.S. was not 
involved. He was cast as the used-car salesman, left to face an irate 
customer whose car collapsed as he drove off the lot. 
VICTORY PARADE: +heir slogan k "Homeland or Peafh." 
CIA UBER ALLES 
HEN THE- CIA got.the green Iight from Washington early in I%% - 
Wto organize an invasion of Cuba, it found Florida t d g  +A& i
exile groups. There were about 100 organizations-an accurate dRmt 
is not possible bemuse they formed ahd folded almost daily--each with 
at least one leader who aspired to -the premiership- of the next C 
pvefTlmtgiX. 
The. eadle chiefs ranged $ t i d y  from wealthy industrialists wfr6 
flourished under Batista and longed for a return to the good old day9; 
to Maduel Ray's Peapleas Revolutionary Movement, dedicated to a b r a 3  
of mid&-class ilbepabrn. In between were businessmen, professionah 
aad politicians who hild lost their holdings under the C~stro revqlutiaq- 
& wdl tts uppaminkts and adventurers. 
$om@ d the groups just talked, but others trained private armiim 
In ~&iit2cm3 Drew Ps2j:son reported that training in the Florida. Ever-- 
glades 'were~"&ident paups financed ,by Ameriwn oolpora&uns whose 
property . w k  seized. by Castro." Richmil H. Rwere reported in thq 
N - i o  Yorkw: "It -ha$ b n  said an ww11ent authority that part of t8s dmy that supported the e h  during *eir months of pepantion for 
Itbe invasion came from private interests-sugar, oil, shipping and telts 
phones." 
The p u p s  had only this in common: Each wanted to ov 
revolutim and wne had a mass fb110wing >in Cuba or among 
T ' l t~  CIA came rta -the smm with an ~n pocketbook and a 
mind It to& to its hosm andpurse the Rewa1at;imary Rwovery 
men%* The R;RM. was small, metiunary and, a&&t4 It kept a d a m  
G - d r j r  W . h g  -hq a f* in: 2&MZ 
Mmd &eZ its baiter; was a foma Catholic stxident le 
bad with CaStm briefly aRbR t6e Revolution and who h q l  
closeties?'&& the Spanish Jesuit community in Cuba. William Shannm, . 
said the New York &st: m e  CIA discovered Manuel Artbe . . j 
and has gro~med him to play the role which the late Castillo Arm&. 
played in the Guatemala takeover." 3 1 -3 
But the R.R.M. had little standing with other edes. Cuban .busin& 
men looked on it as an adventw&t group with no clear e m n o d  . a  - 26 - ' '
program. To establish a firmer base, the CIA fostered a united front of 
five grdups, including the R.R.M. 
The new combination was called the Democratic Revolutionary 
Front. Its political line was conservative, but it could not be tied 
to Batista. Its leader, Manuel Aptonio Varona, was respectable and 
safe. He was Prime Minister in the Prio government in 1947. He 
advocated the return of land expropriated by the revolution to the 
original owners, except for "about 15 per cent" that is not productive. 
"The need for agrarian reform in Cuba," Varona said, "is a myth." 
The CIA showered money on the Front. Time reported (April 
28): "Estimates of how much money was pumped into the Front for 
recruiting centers and other political expenses vary from $130,000 
monthly to a high of $520,000 last December." 
Miami proved a bonanza for the CIA'S recruiting drive. There were 
40,000 Cubans in the city, 27,000 of them recent emigres. Many were 
broke and did not speak English. At first they were a source of cheap 
labor for the hotels, but when the recession hit, they lost their jobs. 
While the Immigration Service admitted all freely, it did not permit the 
exiles to leave Florida. 
The CIA designated the Front's office in Miami as general staff 
headquarters and established training bases in Florida in the Everglades 
and in Homestead, as well as camps near New Orleans and Houston. 
Other bases were set up in Panama and on Vieques Island, off Puerto 
Rim. 
But the expanding army needed more room. Time reported: "As the 
plans for a frontal invasion took shape, CIA men went to Guatemala 
and arranged with rancher-businessman Roberto Alejos (brother of 
Guatemala's Ambassador to the U.S.) to use three of his properties 
-coffee plantations named Helvetia and La Suiza near the town of 
Retalhuleu, and a cotton farm called San Jose Buenavista, 35 miles 
from the Pacific port of San Jose-as camps to train an army of invasion. 
("No charge,' said Alejos. 'Just remember me in Havana.') 
"Through Alejos, the CIA also arranged a $1,000,000 hurry-up sur- 
facing of a 5,000-ft. airstrip at Retalhuleu. . . . Later, Alejos helped 
establish two more camps, one at San Juan Acul, close to the Mexican 
border, the other at Dos Lagunas in the jungles of northern Guate- 
mala." Camps were also set 'up in *Trax, Champerico and Sayaxche. 
While the camps were an open secret in Miami, Washington denied 
their existence. Time said: "Alejos last winter allowed nosey journalists -to 
visit the Helvetia plantation. Before they arrived, the Cubans were 
bansferred to nearby La Suiza; they were brought back as soon as the 
visitors left." 
CIA instructors at the camps were counterrevolutionary experts, re- 
cruited from around the world. A Filipino, who gained his experience in 
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BEFORE: in Miami, the invasion looked like a lark. 
the campaign against the Huksr was in charge of guerilla training a t  the 
Panama camp. Other instructors were described by recruits as Germans, 
Poles, Czechs and Ukrainians. They spoke to the trainees through inter- 
preters. Many of the U.S.-born CIA men also did not speak Spanish. * 
All were known by code names. I 
Strict discipline was maintained at the camps. All but a few officers 
were prohibited from going into town. Time reported: "Exiles also say 
that they were subjected to lie-detector tests before going to camps 
(sample question: Have you had homosexual relations?) and were 
threatened with deportation or detention camps at McAllen, Texas, if 
they got out of line." 
But the recruits did get out of line. Fist fights and even gun 
battles were reported. Politics was the major source of friction. Although 
Batista supporters were supposed to have been screened out, they 
appeared at all camps in top ranks. 
The New York Times (April 26) reported that after President 
Kennedy ordered the camps purged of Batista men, "on many occasions 
agents of the Central Intelligence ~ ~ d l c ~  in charge of the camps refused 
to expel Batista men on the ground that these soldiers and officers-had 
military experience and that was more irn rtant than their politid.. 
background." xgs~-v;FeiF+: 
~ i m e  reported: "When one Frente (Front) man mentioned the 
Batista recruits to a U.S. colonel, the colonel dismissed the matter with 
'they're anti-communists, aren't they? " 
Manuel Penabaz, one of the invaders who managed to get back to 
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the U.S., reported that the chief of the general staff in Miami was Col. 
Martin ~ l e n a ,  a former &cer in ~atista's army. 
On Jan. 31 about 300 men at the camp in Trax were assembled and 
told by "Frank," the CIA agent in charge, that two of the leaders had 
been sent away "for playing politics" and that Capt. Jose Perez San 
Roman, a former Batista officer, was now in command. Because of 
the change, 230 asked to resign. 
After a week the recruits went on strike. But on assurances and 
threats from "Frank," all but 20 went back to training. On Feb. 11, 
eight of the strikers were taken under guard to La Suiza, where they 
were held prisoner with six others who had argued with San Roman. 
One of the prisoners, Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa, a lawyer, said that 
they were questioned separately by "Pat," whom Nodal described as 
"six feet, four inches tall and about 230 pounds and stupid." Later they 
were given lie-detector tests and interrogated about possible communist 
mnections. 
Eventually the group was taken to a camp in the Peten jungle and 
"guarded by Americans with automatic weapons." They were told they 
would be turned over to San Roman "in handcuffs" after the invasion. 
But on April 28, 11 days after the unsuccessful invasion, they were 
returned to Miami and released. 
The CIA handled the refugee political leaders with equal disregard. 
It  openly adopted Artime. although other exiles referred' to him as a 
"Franco Falangist." One CIA man said of Artime : "He's my golden boy.'' 
While the CIA bestowed money and honors on Artime and the 
Front leaders, it withheld support from Ray's liberal M.R.P. In protest 
against the CIA'S tactics, one of the Front leaders, right-wing but 
independent Aureliano Sanchez Arango, took his group out of the 
combination. In a memo to Front leaders, in October, IMO, he wrote: 
AFTER: on the beach, i t  fumed ou+ to be a cruel hoax. 
"The brief history of the relations between the Front and the organism 
assigned to deal with Cuban questions is the history of an incessant 
series of pressures and impositions." 
By the middle of last February, the CIA moved to pull the groups 
together in a quasi government-in-exile. Stuart Novins said in The 
Reportm (May 11) that "the CIA brought the leaders of. the opposing 
factions [including Ray] together and told them to work out a rnodzrs 
Wen& or else." Or else meant an end to money and arms. 
Deputy CIA director Richard Bissell Jr.,'kho was in charge of the. 
operation, assigned agent Frank Bender to work with the exile groups. 
Bender was described by Shannon in the Post as a middle-aged German 
who had fought in the French underground and joined U.S. intelligence 
after the war. Shannon called him a "vain, domineering man who refers 
to himself in the third person: 'Bender will have another cup of coffee.' " 
Bender gave the exile leaders a list of 26 names, from which he asked 
them to pick 10 to participate in the selection of a provisional president. 
But Cubans refused because they did not recognize six names on the list. 
The exiles finally agreed on March 20 and named a Cuban Revolutionary 
Council, headed by Jose Miro Cardona. 
The council was assigned the public relations role of issuing state- 
ments and building morale. The CIA, and later the Pentagon, took 
charge of the invasion. In the final stages a U.S. colonel ran the show. 
On April 16, the day before the invasion, the council-except Artime, 
who was with the invaders as commander-in-chief-was taken from a 
meeting at New York's Hotel Lexington to Philadelphia and from 
there it was flown to an abandoned house near Miami. Armed guards 
surrounded the house and kept the exiles from leaving. 
From a radio the co~~ncil learned of the invasion and heard reports 
of statements issued in its name. On April 18, a U.S. colonel briefed the 
exile leaders on the military situation. White House aides Adolph 
Berle Jr. and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. came at dawn on April 19 from 
Washington to reassure the Cubans. 
The council members returned with Berle and Schlesinger to Wash- 
ington and held three meetings with President Kennedy. From Wash- 
ington thelcouncil issued a statement, which all knew to be made up of 
lies. It  said the invasion "was in fact a landing mainly of supplies and 
support for our patriots who have been fighting in Cuba for months. 
. . . Regretfully we admit tragic losses among a small holding force. 
the force fought Soviet tanks and artillery, while being attacked by 
Russian MIG aircraft." 
The New Yorker magazine summed up the invasion: "It used to be 
said that you would never need an enemy if you had a Hungarian 
for a friend, and Senor Castro has probably by now concluded that you 
will never need a friend if you have the CIA for an enemy." 
FIZZLE MOST STREPITANT 
Y THE END OF MARCH the Cuban community in Miami was 
swept by a sense of anticipation. Something big seemed in the wind. 
On March 28 the Revolution Council issued a mobilization order. Vol- 
unteers were signed up in Miami and shipped off to training camps as 
fast as they could be processed. Manuel Panabaz recalled in his diary 
from a Guatemala training camp: "April 8-We've also heard they have 
eliminated the general staff in Miami, and that means the brakes are off 
on shipment of any Cuban who wants to train for battle, despite his 
political background. Any Cuban who wants to fight communism now 
has the right to carry a rifle, and they're arriving in droves." 
Tad Szulc reported from Miami in the New York Times April 
8: "Families and friends gathered to bid farewell to the soldiers who 
assemble at night at certain Miami buildings. The men are given khaki 
uniforms, then put aboard trucks to be driven to abandoned Florida 
airfields where unmarked aircraft are waiting to fly them to Central 
America." 
Five days later Szulc wrote: "Not a night goes by without the 
departure from here of khaki-uniformed volunteers for the revolutionary 
camps. . . . Cuban physicians and nurses in the Miami area are 
being mobilized for the six medical units being assembled at undisclosed 
spots." 
Other invasion preparations were also under way. From Laughlin 
Air Force base in Texas, according to Newsweek, a U-2 photo recon- 
naissance plane of the type that flew over the USSR flew over Cuba. 
"The mission," Newsweek said, "gave the CIA a set of near-perfect 
pictures of Cuban airfields ( and - the planes on them ) and military 
bases." 
At dawn on April 15, B-26 bombers flown by counterrevolutionaries 
attacked Cuban airfields. Their purpose was to destroy Cuba's air force. 
On returning to their Caribbean bases, they reported total success and 
produced aerial photographs to prove it. 
At the UN, in answer to Cuban charges of aggression, Stevenson 
THE FAMED CZECH QUADRUPLE-BARRELED WEAPON: 
Cubans called it the "Quatro Boca" and used it against the invaders' 8-26 bombers. 
stuck to. a CIA "cover story" that the bombings had been carried 
out by defectors from the Cuban air force, from Cuban airfields. Two 
of the planes landed in; Florida, Stevenson said, and the pilots identified 
themselves as defectors. But their names were withheld. 
The artifice was quickly exposed. Time reported thatia few bullets 
had been fired into an old Cuban B-26 in U.S. hands and\"a pilot took . 
off. in the crate and landed it at Miami with an engine needlessly 
feathered and a cock-and-bull story that he had attacked the airfields, 
' 
A reporter noted that dust and undisturbed grease covered bomb-bay 
fittings, electrical connections to rocket mounts were corroded, guns were 
uncocked and unfired." When the pilot's picture was published, he . 
was promptly identified in Cuba and by exiles in Miami as Lieutenant 
Zuniga, a flyer from the Guatemala training base in Retalhuleu. 
Two other air strikes were planned for April 17, just before the 
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landings. But they were vetoed on the advice of Rusk, Stevenson and 
Bowles. Joseph Newrnan reported in the N. Y. Herald Tribune: "The 
three foreign policy advisers argued that additional attacks would make 
it impossible for them to uphold the official United States contention 
that this country was not a direct participant in the Cuban attack and to 
answer charges that the U.S. was committing acts of aggression in 
violation of the United Nations Charter and provisions of the Organiza- 
tion of American States." 
Prior to this, the exiles had broken camp in Guatemala during the first 
week of April and moved to a staging &ea in Puerto ~abgzas, Nic- 
aragua. They were loaded on ships April 10 and 11 at Great Corn 
and Little Corn islands, just off the Nicaraguan coast. The islands belong 
to Nicaragua but have been on a 99-year lease to the U.S. since 1916. 
According to' Time, the ships had been "painted black and equipped 
with guns and radar in New Orleans." They set sail April 11. U.S. 
destroyers and an aircraft carrier (Castro said there were also sub- 
marines) provided escort until the armada was five miles from the 
Cuban shore. Possibly to cover the deployment of U.S. ships off Cuba, 
Washington had announced early in the month that part of the Second 
Fleet would hold maneuvers in the Caribbean April 22-23. It also said 
that President Kennedy would witness the maneuvers. (After the inva- 
sion fizzled, the maneuvers were canceled.) 
The CIA had organized the invasion fleet months before and recruited 
Cuban exiles as seamen. It bought old LCIs (Landing Craft Infantry) 
and old fishing boats and it rented three cargo ships from Garcia Lines 
BULLSEYE: Quatro Bocas brought down a 8-26, while U.S. newspampers credited Soviet- 
made MIGs. 
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-Rio Escondido, Huston and Atlantic. It bought two of the LCIs through 
Miami yacht broker Charles A. Mills for $240,000, including recondition- 
ing. Drew Pearson reported that those who h o w  ships "estimate that. 
the vessels were worth around $30,000 each." The Garcia Lines ships 
were rented for two months at $7,000 a month, in addition to a guarantee 
of $100,000 for each ship in case of damage. 
Pearson reported (May 6) : "The CIA did not seem to trust Cubans 
with the liberation of their own homeland and hired Am&ican merchanf 
officers to command this private navy of ancient ships. Many of thesh, 
American mercenaries turned out to be drunks and derelicts. 'Sum 
even refused to associate with the Cubans they were supposed to lead, 
One skipper, G. C. Julian, insisted upon nadng his Cuban freedo 
vessel the 'Barbara J,' after his wife." 
Eduardo Garcia, head of Garcia Lines, considered himself in 'r 
man a& designated the Rio Escondido as the flagship. Cuban 
named the LC1 BZugard as flagship, unaer an American merchant. 
who understood no Spanish. Pearson said that in the middle o 
invasion, the American "forgot the battle plan." A Cuban on board whb 
had memorized the plan "prompted him on what orders to issue." 
"Thus the invasion started off with two flagships in command, ea 
giving orders," Pearson added. "In addition, several crew members wo 
take orders from only Jesus Blanco, a former Cuban naval officer, w 
had recruited them." 
AU the invaders' aviation gas, tank shells and anti-tank mines wer 
placed on the Rfo E s c d & .  Early in the fighting it was hit by a bomb 
from a Sea Fury and went down in flames with its cargo. The ship 
carrying most .of the communications equipment also was sunk. 
,Capt Nino Diaz and a force of 168 commandos trained in Louis 
were supposed to make a diversionary landing elsewhere on the C 
coast. The commandos sailed on the Sunta Ana on schedule. They  we^$! 
certaiq they were headed for Oriente province where Diaz had foug* 
with Castro and where he knew the terrain intimately. But 
Diaz opened his orders, he learned that he was to land in Ca 
In disgust, Diaz refused to make the landing and ordered the s 
back to port. A 
C$I the beach, the other counterrevo~utionaries also 'got s 
The Cuban air force, which was supposed to have been 
was in the air around the clock. The militia, which was's 
defect in droves, fought with fury. A captured invader. recoun 
When we met the &st bunch of militiamen we told them .they m 
surrender. They shouted 'PatFia o Muerte' and started shooting 
The invaders were told, according to ~ e w k e k ,  that Castro wo 
be vacationing at his Gshing cabin two hours' march from the 
The msuspeotlng Premiei was to be an easy They foilnd 
-a- 
THE OLD DAYS ARE GONE: invade& today aid not @?th machetes, but with 
.mddern field sfillery. , 
but he was on a tank, firing its gun. 
In the cities, the "secret" underground agents, who were supposed 
to set off uprisings, were arrested before they could make a move. 
The whole show was over in less than three days. 
In the late hours of April 18, invader Capt. San Roman appealed 
for U.S. air support, speaking from a walkie-talkie to a U.S. ship off 
shore. The appeal was relayed to CIA operations chief Bissell. At 
2 A.M. on April 19 a group met with President Kennedy to decide 
whether to send U.S. planes. Some urged the President to send Navy 
aircraft. Some reports say that President Kennedy said it was too 
late to intervene; others say he refused flatly. The Herald-Tribune 
reported that a snag in naval communications made it impossible to 
send an order before the battle was over. 
But Drew Pearson wrote (May 9)  : "Kennedy finally ordered Amer- 
ican  lanes into action in a last-minute effort to save the rebels from 
A 
collapse. But when Navy planes finally got off their nearby carrier, their 
only contribution to freedom was to help Castro. They shot down a 
rebel B-26." 
In any event, it was too late for planes alone to succor the rebels. 
Bv A~ri l  19 most of those who were still alive had surrendered or fled 
J A 
into the swamps, to be captured later. Some managed to get away in 
small boats and were later picked up by U.S. ships. Chalmers M. 
Roberts said in the Washington Post April 25: "When the battle was 
ending on the beach some of the wounded were taken off by American 
naval vessels." The survivors were taken to Camp Garcia, a U 
Marine baie on Viequa Island, Puerto .Ern. They were interrogat 
by CIA men and on May 2 they were released. Some are known to havi 
returned to Miami; the others are still not accounted for, 
On the Sunday following the invasion Castro spoke on televis 
and radio all afternoon, analyzipg in full detail what had occurre 
After the April 15th air rw, he reported1 "we said to ours 
thk is the aggression. What we still don't lmow is why they didn't Ian 
the same day, but gave us two days in which to mobilize. Th 
committed a grave error. We '[speaking of himself and his aides ] h 
adopted the habit of sleeping in the afternoons and not at night; 
on Sunday night we had gone to bed foIIowing the funeral of 
air attack victims, and were wakened with news of fighting at 
two Playas in the Cienaga de Zapata." 
After -Castro2s .speech, captured counterrevolu~onaries were put 
TV and dowed to explain themselves. .For -three evenings &e' inv 
were questioned by Cuban editors and Castro himself. Most o 
captives were contrite. They blamed the. CIA for deceiving them. 
had been told that the people were dissatisfied with Castro; that he h 
turned wer the country to the Russians; that there were Soviet mis 
bases on the island; and that they would be greeted as liberators by 
& a .  
But home of the prison&s held to their views. They debated wit$&$ 
Castro and the editors. Cedric Belfrage reported the TV d i s c u s s i o ~ ~  
in :National ~uuraihn May 8, thus: :P 
In discussion with one of the few Negro 'liberators" about 
"what could have brought you here," Fidel turned to the son of 
a wealthy Cuban family (who had just said he came to fight 
for "his ideals") and asked if he belonged to any club in Havana. ci 
The wealthy white liberator replied: "Yes, the Yacht Club." 
"Did they allow Negroes in there?" "No." Fidel turned back to 
the Negro and said: 
I 
"So you can join this man to fight our revolution, but you 
can't bathe on the same beach with him-and he never worried 
about that but accepted it-as though your color would come off 
in the seawater." All discrimination, he added, had been wiped 
out by the revolution. 
, 4 
Prisoners mentioned several claims of the revolution which 
they had been told in the U.S. were false, such as the turning 
of barracks into schools, the guarantees to small property-owners 
under Urban Reform. Fidel asked: 'Would I be making such ' 
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claims before the whole Cuban people if they were not true?" 
Landowners were allowed up to $800 a month from their prop- 
erty, and he asked a prisoner: "Did you ever ,make that much?" 
"Never in my life." "Think you could live on it, with your own 
house and car?" "I'll say I could!" 
As an example of Cuba's type of democracy, Fidel described 
the present setup in rural coops where the campesinos run their 
own affairs including public order. In former days, starving 
under the extortions and terror of the police, the campesinos 
sold their votes and senators and representatives whom they 
"elected became millionaires from graft. None of the "ideal- 
ist" prisoners who needled Fidel about elections, who "idolatrize 
Yanqui democracy," could deny this. 
"Do you," asked Fidel, "know a single member of the 
revolutionary government who is a millionaire?" Nobody did, 
but one prisoner said: "They say that you yourself have many 
millions of dollars in Switzerland." Fidel took this in stride, 
saying that U.S. papers could publish such nonsense but 
"absolutely no one here has the slightest doubt about the 
honesty of this government. Supposing the U.S. spent $10 million 
on this expedition, wouldn't they gladly have spent $15 million 
to buy us? Why didn't they try? Because the know we are not 
for sale." [Actually the invasion cost $45 million.-Ed. ] 
In the days of electoral "democracy" there were a half million 
kids without schools, a half million workers without jobs, a 
million and a half illiterates, millions of acres owned by a hand- 
ful of companies, fantastic rents, discrimination, and the com- 
mon folk couldn't even use the beaches. In the Cienaga de 
Zapata where the "liberators" landed they had seen the chinges 
wrought in two years by the revolution. 
The roundup of invaders from the swamps continued for some two 
weeks. A final count of captives totaled 1,214. Eight hundred of these 
came from families who owned a total of 27,556 caballerias of land 
( a caballeria is about 33 acres ) , 9,666 houses,' 70 industries, ten 
sugar centrals, two banks and five mines. One hundred and thirty-five 
were former Batista soldiers and police. The rest were adventurers and 
"'idealists ." 
On May 17, Castro offered to return the prisoners-except for 
those wanted for murder under Batista-if the U.S. would idemnify 
Cuba for the invasion damage with 500 tractors. If the deal was not 
approved, he said, the prisoners would be put to work digging defenses 
against another invasion. 
LIES BY THE DOZEN 
HE FULL STORY of the invasion came to light bit by bit. It 
Tpoured from the mouths of exiles eager to document their deception 
by Washington. It oozed from the wounded egos of American officials 
who wanted to absolve themselves. It was leaked by others looking 
to minimize their responsibility. 
But none of the debates answered a basic question of why U.S. in- 
volvement in the invasion came as a surprise to Americans. That it should 
have been a shock to the reading public is a black mark against 
American newspapers. Few stories have been more grossly mishandled 
and the public rarely has been lied to more wilfully. The story was 
there for all to see but the editors chose to wear blinders. 
While the CIA operation was an open secret in Florida and 
throughout Latin America, U.S. publications pretended that the invasion 
preparations and the training camps were being handled by exiles. They 
also reported every extravagant claim of the exiles as gospel, while 
they scoffed at or ignored contradictory reports from Cuba. The story 
was so wide open one observer said that the code names. and phone 
numbers of CIA agents in Miami were known in every beer joint. 
A New York businessman visiting Tampa a few days before the invasion 
was told casually by an associate that landings would take place within 
a week. 
As long ago as October, 1960, La Hora in Guatemala reported on 
invasion preparations and CIA-run camps. Cuban papers and radio 
stations heard here told of the build-up regularly. But the first report 
in a U.S. publication directly implicating the CIA was not published 
until Nov. 19, when the Nation reported that Dr. Ronald Hilton, 
director of the Institute of Hispanic-American Studies at Stanford U., had 
disclosed that the CIA had acquired a tract of land in Guatemala for 
$1,000,000 for training troops. But it was months before other publica- 
tions, -except National Guurdian, followed up the story. 
In hindsight, Reston commented in the Times April 26: 
"Cuban radio was broadcasting all about these camps and the U.S. 
NQ PLEASURE TRIP: when Fidel hsd time to fish, he used to like to go to Cienags 
de Zapata. This time he had .another mission. 
Government's part in them weeks before they were discussed in the 
American press. The official line in Washington was that this was a 
Secret' operation, but it was about as secret as opening day-at Yankee 
Stadium. 
"In fact the only people who knew very- little about what .was 
happening back in the early planning stages of the exercise were the 
American people who were unknowingly picking up the tab . . ." 
Reston might have included his own paper in the spanking. A few 
days before his article, WCBS-TV Views the News took the Times to 
task for coming very late to the story. With a full bkeauih Havana 'and 
reporters in ~ i i m i ,  the Tames editors surely hid the story. Btit with 
the rest, they reported Castro's warning of imminent invasion by CIA- 
trained troops as hysterical rantings. 
But it must be said that when the editors took the wraps 6f the 
reporters, the Times did a splendid job. Ted Szulc's reports from Miami 
were particularly noteworthy. ' -. 
MO- H. Rubhi, reporting, on his tour of Cuba in the June, 1961, 
issue of The Progressioe, explained how the deception worked. *He 
wrote : 
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"I talked with virtually 'all the American correspondents in Havana 
-and the correspondents of Canadian, British and German newspapers 
as well. I came away convinced that they are far more torn by doubt 
about Castrds Cuba than their dispatches would indicate. For example, 
one correspondent who has been strongly anti-Castro in his commentaries 
confessed he was confused, that there was much good mixed with the 
bad, although he emphasized the latter in his reports 'because that's 
what they seem to want back home.' 
"Typical of press coverage of Cuba before the April invasion was 
this depressing incident: 
"Cuba's Foreign Minister Roa sent a note to the various Latin 
American embassies.& The note contained the usual tirades against North 
American imperialism, but the heart of its contents was a plea to the 
Latin American governments to use their good offices to explore the 
prospect of negotiations between Cuba and the United States. 
"An American correspondent heard of the note 48 hours before it 
was released to the public. He cabled a story to his newspapers, empha- 
sizing the revival of official Cuban sentiment for negotiation with the 
United States. But the newspaper killed the story, preferring for its 
Cuban coverage that day a wire service report that two Catholic 
nuns had been arrested and detained for six hours. The management 
of the newspaper cabled its Havana correspondent a sour message 
pointing out that it was not especially interested in interpretive stories 
of the kind filed on the Cuban willingness to negotiate-although it was 
a clear scoop on a story that was to break in all the papers in a day 
or two-and that it was interested only in 'hard, headline news'-stories 
of bombs that go off or nuns being arrested by Castro's police." 
Rubin concluded bitterly: 
"For what it seems to want out of Cuba, the American press would 
do better to staff its Havana offices with police reporters rather than 
foreign correspondents ." 
Much of the pre-invasion "analysis'' that the Cubans wanted to get 
rid of Castro and that the exile chiefs were popular leaders back home 
with extensive "underground support was fed to the papers by Lem 
Jones Associates, Inc. in New York and Abrams, Osborne and Associates 
in Miami, public relations outfits hired by the Revolutionary Council 
and paid indirectly by the CIA. After the invasion Jones Associates owned 
up to staging two "stunts" that had been reported as pure news. One was 
to import some 60 'Women in Black" from Miami to appear in St. 
Patrick's Cathedral in New Y ~ r k  while Castro was attending UN 
sessions in September, 1960. 
During the fighting, reports of counterrevolutionary successes filled 
the papers. .The invaders were moving inland; the militia was deserting, 
Castro was wounded, no, he was dead, no, he was wounded; Raul Castro 
was captured; Che Guevara committed suicide. On top of these 
remarkable successes, the press suddenly noted that the invasion had 
collapsed. 
How fiction can turn up in print on the news pages was explained 
in part by Joe Alex Morris Jr. in the New York Herald Tribune April 
20. He reported that during the fighting, Abrams, Osborne and Associates 
(particularly one young red-headed associate, Mary Berrer) were 
doing their job "with Madison Avenue efficiency and the pitch is a 
hard sell stressing the sigdicance, size and success of the Cochinos 
Bay landing and other guerrilla operations." 
While the Revolutionary Council leaders were held prisoner in 
Florida by the CIA, the PR outfits turned out regular bulletins in their 
name on the fighting. One comm~~nique credited "MIG aircraft" with 
destroying "sizable amounts of medical supplies and equipment." 
The story of Soviet-made MIG jets in the Cuban air force was 
dutifully repeated across the country. Some rear-echelon pundits turned 
out columns blaming the invaders' defeat on Castro7s MIGs. Yet it 
was well known that Cuba had no MIGs. Joseph Newman reported 
in the Herald Tribune May 1 that the CIA knew that the Cuban air 
force has only a few U.S.- and British-made planes. 
Sen. Wayne Morse ( D-Ore.) finally pinned down the story on 
May 14, when he said that Administration witnesses at the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearings confirmed there was no evidence 
"that there was a single Russian MIG in Cuba." 
.Faced with the bungling, most editors refused to report or even 
to be embarrassed. They could justify the mishandling of news as a 
blow against communism. If they needed further justification, President 
Kennedy supplied it April 27 to a meeting of the American Newspaper 
Publishers Assn. He called on the press to exercise "self-restraint" 
in fighting the "fierce struggle" in which we are engaged. He added: 
"Every newspaper now asks itself, with respect to every story, 'It is news? 
All I suggest is that you add the question: 'Is it in the interest of 
national security."' (Monthly Review editor Leo Huberman, who was 
in Cuba during the invasion, suggested a preferable criterion, "Is 
it the tryth?") 
The implication was clear. Reporting U.S. intervention in Cuba 
was not in the national interest; pretending it hadn't happened was. 
A few papers refused to bend. The Times printed an editorial called, 
"The Right Not to Be Liied To." It said: "The Cuban tragedy has raised 
a domestic issue that is likely to come up again and again. . . . Is a 
democratic government in an open society such as ours ever justified 
in deceiving its own people?" The Times answered itself: "Neither 
prudence nor ethics can justify any administration in telling the public - 
things that are not so." 
In California, the little El Cajon Valley News put it plaintively: 'Why 
Do They Lie To Us About Cuba?" 
WORLD-WIDE CONDEMNATION - 
EASURED BY WORLD REACTION Operation Pluto turned the 
U.S. democratic image into a mirage and lowered John F. Ken- 
nedy's prestige to the level of Richard Nixon's. As news of the invasion 
spread, thousands in Latin America, Europe and Asia poured into the 
streets to demonstrate against "Yankee Imperialism." At home there were 
protests outside the UN and in more than a dozen cities. 
In NATO countries many were privately pleased over Washington's 
embarrassment. Some recalled pious words from the U.S. against 
imperialism when they were being divested of former colonies. In 
Britain and France the invasion was called the "American Suez," referring 
to their joint invasion of Egypt in 1958 which the U.S. disowned. 
I 
Many of the demonstrators were students. Others were those who i 
had long opposed U.S. foreign policy, but for a good number it was 
a first break with Washington. Despite the denials of U.S. participation, i 
few doubted that the counterrevolution was a Yankee show. 
In New York demonstrations against the invasion outside the UN 
started on April 17 and continued through the week. The first day 
2,000 people picketed the U.S. mission and then marched to the UN. 
The slogan "Hands Off Cuba" united liberals, progressives and non- 
political persons with Cubans living in New York. 
Counterdemonstrations by anti-Castro Cubans heckled the lines. I 
As the invasion's failure became clear, Hungarian "freedom fighters" 
and other "professional pickets" joined the counterdemonstratibns. They 
picketed the Soviet Embassy, throwing rocks and burning Russian flags. 
On April 21, a Fair Play for Cuba Committee rally at Union Square 
drew 3,000 persons. 
The same day, the Fair Play committee took a large ad in the New 
York Times, appealing to the American conscience. It said: "If our 
government's activities are, as we believe, illegal and immoral, then we as 
a nation stand condemned." The same ad was refused by the St. Louis 
Post-Dhpatch and all four Chicago dailies. 
.h ad headlined, "A Declaration of Conscience by Afro-Americansy' 
and signed by 27 prominent Negroes appeared in the Baltimore Afro- 
American April 22. It concluded: "Afro-Americans, don't be fooled-the 
enemies of the Cubans are our enemies, the jirncrow bosses of this land 
where we are still denied our rights." 
Signers included Dr. W. E. B. DuBois and his wife, author Shirley 
Graham; William Worthy, Dr. Lonnie Cross, Daniel H. Watts, Robert 
F. Williams, Julian Mayfield, Conrad Lynn and Richard Gibson. 
An ad by the pacifist ~ e l l o w s h i ~  of Reconciliation in the New York 
Times on April 23 also condemned U.S. intervention. Signers included 
Dr. William C. Davidon, Dr. Kermit Eby, Dr. Erich Frornrn, Maxwell 
Geismar. C. Wright Mills, A. J.. Muste, Clarence Pickett, I. F. Stone and 
Norman Thomas. * I .  'st 
An ad hoc pacifist group, Nonviolent Committee for Cuban Inde- 
pendence, held a two-week vigil and fast outside CIA headquarters near 
Washington. On week ends rallies and picket lines were held in coopera- 
tion with the Fair Play committee. Some d the pacifists were arrested 
and served ten-day jail terms. They continued the fast in prison. 
A group of 132 lawyers including top professors in Yale and other 
law schools and Arthur Larson, former U.S. Information Agency Director, 
protested violations of U.S. laws and international obligations committed 
in the undertaking and urged U.S. conformity with international law. 
A group of professors, most of them from Harvard, published an ad 
in the Times deploring the invasion. Harvard history professor H. Stuart 
Hughes said at an American Friends Service Committee (Quaker) 
meeting in Cambridge, Mass., on April 23: "All the pious fraud has 
collapsed. Everyone from the New York Times down has . . . admitted 
the fact of American intervention in Cuba. President Kennedy hasn't 
admitted his fault and, until he does, we have to withhold our confidence 
in him." 
He said "it is time for a few resounding resignations" from the admin- 
istration. Of Stevenson, he found it alarming "to see this man who has 
been a great American reduced to the level of a shyster lawyer." 
A meeting of 400 Harvard students and faculty members approved 
a resolution urging a reversal of U.S. policy toward Cuba. 
Students in San Francisco marched from a Union Square rally on 
April 20 to the Federal Building to protest the counterrevolution. Some 
2,000 persons attended the rally. The day before 200 students at the 
U. of California in Berkeley and 200 students at San Francisco State 
College held rallies. On news of the invasion, "Bay Area Students Com- 
mittee to Oppose U.S. Intervention In Cuba" was formed. 
Other demonstrations were organized by students at Michigan, 
Wisconsin and Cornell universities and at Antioch and Oberlin colleges. 
In Los Angeles, the Fair Play Committee picketed the Federal 
Building for three days. About 900 persons from Washington and 
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3al&m piabtd n a  White House 'far two hours on April 23. 
They- were from the Fair Plny committee, 88tb of July Movemat and 
th$ - Uka%onLz hhvernent. One sign read, "Cuba 1s Not 
G ~ ~ d d & ~  .I& C.hileagu, 300 persons picketed the Federal Building 
h the ritCn. One picket wotd his own slogan: 'We Don't Want to Die 
fq tiw2tww Ffuit Co." 
~~@~stsratiom were also held in Baon, Detroit, Cleveland, Seattle, 
New &%ay:en, .Baltimore, Mhnmpoh PW&lphia. and Tampa 
Anti-U.S. demonswans swept Lath America on reports of the 
-invagim. thpt as the extent of CIA involvement became clear, slogans 
bmd- rm Prbident K d y .  Thm~bbse who had haped that his election 
signalled a. niie U.S. policy in Uth America turned out to denounce 
b,". -. 
There wem three days. of dmn011strations in. Mexico City,. involving 
ad many as 85,000 persons at one the. A h t  15,000 turned out at a 
maroh d e d  by studenti at the Mexican National University. At the 
heaa of the column weie members of the Pancho ViUa Brigade, a groupL 
which offetd to go. ta Cuba to defend Cast~o: 
S t i ~ h t r ;  .&anted: "Castro Si, Kennedy No." Ase line neared the 
National Palaw, 1,080 soldiers9 police a d  hemen attacke.d the marchers. 
e .  . In ' Ve~ixzda  students led .demonstrations throughout the country. 
Hig;a.&oolj: in Caracas were c l d  for a week aher'students burned a 
U.S. flag in a public plaza. Demonstrations of high school students 
in Puerto Cabello, Valencia, San Cristobal and Maracaibo were broken 
up by police. 
One of the biggest demonstrations in recent Uruguayan history 
was held April 22. Some 8,000 persons marched through Montevideo 
chanting, "Cuba Si, Yanquis, No." A rally, which included speakers 
from right- and left-wing parties, denounced President Kennedy as 
paranoic" and as "the worst imperialist in 50 years." 
The New York Times reported: "Although Uruguay's government 
and most of the press had praised Mr. Kennedy's policy, many Uruguay- 
ans, including some who have been traditionally pro-Westem and cool 
toward the Castro regime, joined the demonstration." 
Anti-U.S. sentiment in Brazil carried into the government and news- 
papers. Six federal and state legislators presented a petition at the 
U.S. Embassy urging President Kennedy to "make every effort to see 
that the counte~evolutionary and mercenary - invaders - of the Cuban 
nation should not have any- support from the U.S. government." 
A leading Rio de Janeiro paper Diario de Noticias summed up: 
"President Kennedy must come to understand that the future of rela- 
tions between the U.S. and Latin America is at stake . . . [former Vice 
President] Nixon was spit upon because there was a Guatemala as a 
repulsive symbol of a certain policy toward Latin America. What awaits 
Kennedy?" 
In Bogota, Colombia, 500 demonstrators attempting to reach the 
U.S. Embassy April 17 were attacked and dispersed by police. Two 
days later, 8,000 persons gathered for an anti-U.S. rally in the city's 
main square. 
The defeat of the counterrevolution spread apprehension through 
Guatemala. The government, which itself was installed by the CIA, 
seemed concerned that Cuba might retaliate against Guatemala for 
its help to the counterrevolution. 
Despite tear gas barrages and clubbings by police, anti-U.S. dem- 
onstrations went on for a week in Guatemala City. President Kennedy 
was denounced as an "arch assassin" and his picure was burned at 
meeting. Demonstrators broke windows in the Pan American World 
Airways and United Fruit Co. offices after they were prevented from 
marching on the U.S. Embassy by police. 
There were demonstrations at U.S. embassies in East and West Europe 
on the first days of the invasion. Later there were few in NATO 
capitals to defend the U.S. An-gry demonstrators denounced "U.S. im- 
perialism" in Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Bucharest, Sofia and Belgrade. 
Students also demonstrated in Paris, Rome and Helsinki. In London 
65 prominent persons, including 29 Labor Members of Parliament, sent 
telegrams to President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, UN secy.- 
gen. Hammarskjold and Premier Castro expressing "shock" at the invasion. 
Claude Julien wrote in Le Monde in Paris: "The naivete of the 
American government is incredible." Sueddeutsck Zeitung in Munich, 
West Germany, said: "Many Americans are finally beginning to realize 
that you can't settle with weapons a social revolution such as took 
place in Cuba." 
In Vienna, the Kronenzeitung said: "President Kennedy got a double 
uppercut-&st a Soviet cosmonaut in the skies and now a victorious 
Castro at the doorstep." The executive committee of the. Union of 
Democratic Left, main opposition party in Greece, called- the invasion 
"an act of international piracy." Don Cook, Paris correspondent of the 
New York Herald Tribune, concluded: "There is not much comfort for 
Washington to gain by turning to the opinions of its Europeans allies." 
There was also little comfort for Washington in Asia or Africa. In 
Tokyo students held a demonstration April 18 before the U.S. Embassy 
and four more the next day to coincide with the arrival of U.S. Ambassa- 
dor Reischauer. An unidentified Frenchmar? summed it up best for 
Cook. He said: "You really haven't handled your Cubans very well." 
RETURN TO THE HOMELAND: the invasion cost U.S. taxpayers $45,000,000 and 
Cuban families immeasurable suffering. 
WHAT THE PLAN WAS 
A F T E R  THE FIRST GUSH of news following the invasion's collapse, 
which brought to light most of what had happened, Administra- 
tion and Pentagon officials were ordered to "clam-up" and to direct 
inquiring newsmen to State Department off-the-record briefings. Depart- 
ment officials, who were supposed to pass on to reporters "inside stuff" on 
the invasion, developed instead a quasi-official explanation of the affair. 
It was a little fuzzy and could not withstand deep questioning, but 
Washington relied on the press to play along. The official analysis was 
accepted and passed along by dozens of reporters and columnists. 
In the accepted version, the collapse of Operation Pluto is credited 
to the CIA'S failure to estimate accurately the extent of internal opposi- 
tion to Castro and the strength of his government and armed forces. 
The counter-revolution failed, the story goes, because Cubans neglected 
to revolt and the militia refused to defect. Some with bellicose plans 
for the future embellish the tale with the estimate that the invasion 
would have succeeded if U.S. planes had been committed. Others further 
disparage the CIA by stressing the operational mishaps. 
But the &cia1 story is a transparent over-simplification of what 
most probably was the real plan. The CIA is a handy scapegoat. To 
allow it to draw the fire, conveniently masks the involvement of others. 
Rather than a quixotic bungle, Operation Pluto might be called more 
accurately: The intervention that almost succeeded. 
There is abundant evidence that Washington never expected the 
landings to do more than establish a beachhead where a "provisional 
government" could maintain itself long enough (say a week) to be 
recognized and to appeal for U.S. armed support. Little stock was put 
in a general uprising or in the alleged guerrillas operating in the hills. 
Clearly, Castro was to be overthrown by external armed might. 
The plan failed because the Cubans overwhelmed the invaders with 
such speed that the later stages of Operation Pluto could not be effected. 
To sell the story of an intelligence snafu, which limits the blame 
to the CIA, Gen. Lemnitzer, charman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
testified before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that he and 
other career military men had approved a plan for an invasion ( 1) 
at a point flanked by swamps, with only two good roads leading 
inland; (2) with 1,500 to 1,700 soldiers against an army of 40,000 and 
a militia of 250,000; (3) with no fighter plane protection; and (4) with 
no reserves. 
Lemnitzer told his story to civilian legislators; he might better have 
told it to the marines. Perhaps public embarrassment was Lemnitzer's 
penance for his part in the operation, but his story couldn't hold water 
with anyone who got through GI basic training. Sen. Albert Gore (D- 
Tenn.) concluded from the testimony that "the President needs new, 
wiser and abler men." He added: "I find it perfectly incredible that 
career military officers, charged with such high responsibility, could 
cerbfy as a feasible military undertaking the uncoordinated plan of a 
few hundred ill-equipped Cuban exiles to invade Cuba. . . . There 
were no reserve forces to back up the so-called 'expedition.'" 
Pieced together from what slipped out before the clampdown, this 
is what seems to have been Washington's plan for Cuba: 
Operation Pluto was a multi-stage project. At its maximum it might 
have meant full-scale war, with U.S. and other forces fighting the Cuban 
army and militia. At a minimum it would be a commando raid to probe 
Cuba's defenses. Along the way, there were a series of checkpoints 
at which Washington could decide whether to go further. 
The exiles' mission was to establish and hold a beachhead. As 
soon as it was feasible, the Cuban Revolutionary Council was to be 
flown in and to proclaim itself the new government of Cuba. The U.S. 
and some Latin American countries were to recognize the government 
immediately and respond to its calls for military help. U.S. Marines 
and Navy were to lead an inter-American force into Cuba. 
Before each phase, Washington was to decide whether to proceed 
or to vary the plan to meet a new circumstance. If there was a general 
uprising against Castro, or, if the militia threw down its arms and 
defected, open U.S. involvement might not be necessary. If Castro was 
brash enoug to attack the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba, 
Washington had an even better pretext for action. 
But should the exiles fail to hold out for a week, they were to 
be evacuated and the operation would be chalked up as a large com- 
mando raid like the one at Dieppe, France, in advance of the Second 
Front invasion during World War 11. 
Considerable evidence and opinion favor this explanation over the 
official version. Clearly, Washington never counted on much help from 
the underground in the cities or from guemllas previously planted 
in the Escambray Mountains in Las Villas province. Walter Lippmann 
wrote in the Herald Tribune May 2: "As I understand it, and contrary 
to the general impression, there was no serious expectation that the 
landing of exiles would be followed immediately by political uprising 
against Castro. The object of the landing was to establish a beachhead 
for a civil war." 
In a pre-invasion story, Joseph Newman wrote in the Herald 
Tribune April 14 that the strategy for bringing down Castro "is based 
on a plan to start a Hungarian-type uprising." Newman added: "Once 
the uprising takes place, Cuban revolutionaries will call on the United 
States and other American republics to help them establish a free and 
democratic society." Newman reported that Miro Cardona said that 
"as provisional president, [he] would be entitled to request diplomatic 
recognition and receive aid from outside." 
Newman added: "Having extended diplomatic recognition to the 
provisional government, the United States and other American republics 
could supply economic and military aid without appearing to violate 
their international commitments ." 
If the CIA indeed reported mass discontent in Cuba, President 
Kennedy had considerable advice to the contrary. While the Administra- 
tion might have leaned to its own intelligence voices, it is not likely 
that a plan based on a disputed judgment would have been approved. 
During Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's visit to the U.S. last 
March, he told President Kennedy that British intelligence did not 
forecast an early uprising against Castro. The London Times' Washing- 
ton correspondent later reported that "British intelligence reports sug- 
gesting that the landings in Cuba would not lead to a revolt were 
rejected unread by President Kennedy." 
In addition, Sen. Claibome Pell ( D-R.I. ), a former Foreign Service 
officer, made an unofficial and confidential trip to Cuba last December 
to test the atmosphere. On his return, according to Rowland Evans 
Jr. in the Herald Tribune May 9, Fell reported to the Administration 
that "the people were far from ready to revolt against Fidel Castro." 
Pell said: "I am afraid that it is only true that they were still tasting 
the satisfaction of Castro's land reform, of his nation&zation of 
United States companies and of the other much-touted reforms put into 
effect by Castro. The dispossessed were in jail or in exile." 
If political uprising was a cornerstone of Washington's plan, then 
considerable advance contact with the underground was to be expected. 
But, Time reported, an exile leader complained on April 19: 'We 
offered the complete underground system in Cuba for the purposes of 
coordination. We were capable of bringing about great defections in the 
military inside Cuba, even contacts to bring off a general strike. Why, 
48 hours after the invasion stmted, has this not been done?" 
Stuart Novins said in The Reporter that "Manolo Ray's underground, 
all prepared to hit preselected targets and ready to appeal to the 
Cuban people over at least 14 transmitters scattered across the country 
. . . received no advance word of the landing." 
While the anti-Castro saboteurs were not alerted, other forces were. 
Joe Alex Moms Jr. reported from Miami in the Herald Tribune April 
22: "The U.S. Navy was reported to have two task forces, each with a 
carrier, operating in the [Caribbean] area, instead'of the usual one. Both 
were said to be engaged in routine exercises, as were 1,700 Marines 
in Puerto Rico. But American naval and Air Force units in the area were 
on a constant alert." 
Despite the official word that the Escambray guerillas were to 
carry out harassing attacks and perhaps link up with the beachhead, 
Washington knew that the mountain fighters had been eliminated weeks 
before the invasion. Szulc reported from Miami in the Times April 
7: "It is now conceded here that Dr. Castro succeeded in virtually 
wiping out the Escambray operation in months of action by tens of - 
thousands of his militiamen." Belfrage had reported substantially the 
same story earlier in the Guardian. 
Washington strained hard to convince the world that it did not 
plan to commit U.S. military forces.' It did not convince the exiles. 
Miro Cardona told Time before the invasion: "They [U.S. officials] 
promised me they will use the troops." In Havana, the invaders' 
captured chief Manuel Artirne said : 'We were promised air support." 
Another captive, identified only as Pablo on Cuban TV, said that a CIA 
---- 
1 The false ring to the "official" story made it open season for speculation 
on the real plan. One die-hard Administration supporter insists that 0 eration 
Pluto was President Kennedy's devious scheme to discredit Allen Du es and 
pump $45,000,000 into the economy in one move. 
iP 
A more interesting thesis comes from an imaginative friend who asks to be 
identsed as Mr. Machiavelli. He examines two troubling questions: (1) Why 
did President Kennedy abandon a plan for air coyex?; mcl (2)  Why did he return 
the British intelligence packet unopened? ~ r l . . ; ~ :  -- c 
His answer goes back to the OAS meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica last 
August, where the U.S. hoped to get a strong statement against Cuba as well as 
private support for the invasion plan. But, as Raul Castro warned at the time, 
the Latin American leaders were fearful of open identification with the U.S. 
against Cuba because it would set off angry protests from their own people 
at home. The best Secy. of State Christian Herter could get out of the con- 
ference was a weakly worded Declaration elf San Jose against "intervention 
or threat of intervention' by an extracontinental power, which did not mention 
Cuba. 
World opinion against a Washington-devised invasion of Cuba solidified 
by D-Day and forced President Kennedy to reconsider the air cover scheme. 
The Soviet note threatening to sink U.S. shipping apparently was the clincher. 
President Kennedy, Mr. Machiavelli argues, did not open the British packet 
because it did not contradict what he already knew about the possibilities of 
a Cuban uprising. The CIA in fact did not predict a revolt. But the story 
of CIA predictions was circulated to prepare the agency as scapegoat in case 
the operation failed. 
Thus the President did not want to be on record as having seen a contradictory 
report. -(Ed.) 
man told him that "the U.S. would intervene directly within 15 days 
if the invasion failed." 
In Miami, Manuel Penabez, invasion survivor, said that in the last 
hours, when the attackers called for U.S. planes, this reply came on the 
radio in English: "Don't worry. They will be there soon. Keep fighting." 
Last February Adolph Berle Jr., special advisor to President Kennedy 
on Latin America, took a trip through the hemisphere, ostensibly to 
report the general situation. But on May 11, Brazilian Congressman 
Osmar Cunha report& that during an interview with captured counter- 
revolutionaries in Havana, Artime gave him another version of Berle's 
trip. Cunha, a member of the middle-of-the-road Social Democratic 
party, quoted Artime as saying: "Berle . . . visited Brazil and various 
other countries on the continent with the specific mission of consulting 
and negotiating with these governments the immediate recognition 
of an anti-revolutionary government in Cuba that would be set up by 
invading troops." Cunha added: "Artime told me that the Brazilian 
government was the only one consulted to reject the . . . proposal." 
U.S. News (May 21) reported that some exile leaders said the CIA 
had promised that "once they were established on the beaches, there 
would be support for them by a three-nation force of 30,000 men. 
On rechecking with the Americans, the figure was reduced to 15,000." 
A troubling question to those who accept the purpose of the landing 
as a major thrust inland was the choice of the site at Cienaga de 
Zapata. It is flanked by impassable swamps, with only two roads leading 
to the interior. To break out of the beachhead, invaders would have to 
move along roads on which defenders would be certain to concentrate 
heavy fire. 
But as a defensive position, Cienaga de Zapata is excellent. Castro 
himself described it as "a very dif7icult position to attack, because 
you have to attack it from a highway across the swamp, with only 
three or four entry points, which would be effectively defended with 
tanks, anti-tank guns and heavy mortars." 
Drew Pearson (May 9) confirmed that the invaders' strategy was to 
"hold out in the swamp and on the beach" by mining the "roads 
against the advance of Castro's tanks." Newsweek (May 1 )  reported that 
thd orders for the bulk of the invading forces were to "set up a defense 
for the beachhead." 
The invaders' mission then was to hold the beachhead long enough 
to fly in the six leading members of the Revolutionary Council, 
held under guard near Mia&. U.S. News (May 15) reportea that "on 
a Miami airport were a number of 'C-46s and C-47s, painted white with- 
out markings." One of the planes "was in readiness to transport the 
'Revolutionary Council' to set up an anti-Castro government." 
Had the invaders held the beachhead for a 'few more days, Operation 
Pluto might have "succeeded." The last stages might have been effected; 
the new government established, recognized and reinforced by U.S. and 
other forces in a day or two. 
The operation failed because: 
The tiny cub& air force (six assorted planes ) was never knocked 
out. It dominated the skies and it played havoc with the invaders on 
the beach. 
It underestimated the ability of Cuba's militia and the efficiency 
of its intelligence. Cuban forces fought well and with high morale. 
There are also indications that Castro knew when and where the 
invasion was coming. 
It overestimated, the ability and passion of the counter-revolution- 
aries. That 1,214 of an invading force of between 1,500 and 1,700 sur- 
rendered does not speak well for it. Francis L. McCarthy, Latin 
Arnekican editor of United Press International, told the American News- 
paper Publishers convention that the invading paratroopers "retired 
without orders" at the sound of Cuban artillery. 
While the CIA deserves no kudos for its part in the scheme, it is a 
misjudgment to credit it with more than an agent's share of the blame. 
A member of Congress, described by David Lawrence in the Herald 
Tribune as familiar with facts, found a more just apportionment in 
this characterization: "A case of cumulative stupidity." 
L'Express, Paris 
Sherlock Duller 
A FORTUNATE FAILLJRE 
PERATION PLUTO'S moment of truth came at the White House O meeting in the early hours of April 19 when President Kennedy 
had to choose between writing off the invasion or unleashing U.S. 
forces against Cuba. What went into the President's decision not to 
commit U.S. forces may never be known. Some speculate that he 
thought the,situation was too far gone. Others conclude that he did not 
want to intervene unilaterally after he and Stevenson had stressed 
that U.S. forces were not involved in the landings. One foreign diplomat 
reported the scuttlebutt that Premier Khrushchev had sent a secret 
note threatening that Soviet submarines would retaliate against U.S. 
shipping, if the President sent troops or planes to Cuba. It was recalled 
that Soviet intimations of intervention were credited with causing 
the Franco-British withdrawal from Suez in 1956. 
Whatever President Kennedy's reasons, the world can be thankful that 
he made the decision he made. "Success" for Operation Pluto at best 
would have meant a modern version of the Spanish Civil War, with 
U.S. and perhaps other American troops fighting Cubans. It might 
have created also an "American Algeria3'-a devitalizing and endless 
war against guerillas. At worst, it could have led to nuclear war, if the 
U.S.S.R. made good on its promise to defend Cuba with missiles. 
Walter Lippmann pointed out that should the invasion have started 
a civil war, "no plan seems to have been made, no thought seems to have 
been given, to what we would do then, what the rest of Latin America 
would do then, what the Soviet Union would do, while the civil war 
was being fought." 
Operation Pluto's military aspects were detailed GI fashion, by the 
numbers. There were written plans covering from "D-Day minus 7" 
to "D plus 30." But beyond that the exiles were in such sharp disagree- 
ment that they never could present more than a vague political- 
economic outline for a post-Castro Cuba. Varona was concerned with 
the protection of private property. Ray argued for social justice. 
Miro Cardona stressed the importance of rule by law. Artime, the 
fugitive embezzler, stressed the importance of Artime. 
Did the operation's planners think they could turn back the clock 
in Cuba? Having tasted the fist fruits of agrarian reform, did anyone 
expect the campesinos to go back to the plantation system? Could 
high rents and low pay be reinstituted in the cities and the anti- 
illiteracy campaign ended in the countryside? 
The dynamics of social revolution are that progress breeds further 
progress. Looking back is for the exploiters; the liberated can point 
only forward. Cubans would have fought to protect their newly-won 
gains against whatever force with whatever weapons. Take away their 
"Quatro Bocas," they would have used pistols. Remove their sidearms, 
they would have fought with machetes. And they would have con- 
tinued fighting in the certain knowledge that they were defending 
the future and the U.S. was fighting for the past. 
While Washington reappraises its Cuban policy, there are ominous 
signs that the obvious is being overlooked in favor of the bellicose. 
The exiles, more split than ever-Ray took his group out of the Revolu- 
tionary Council-have dropped the pretense of overturning Castro from 
within and openly advocate direct U.S. intervention. Varona told 
a New York meeting May 7 that the invasion should "teach a lesson" 
to the U.S. that nonintervention is an untenable doctrine in the fight 
against communism. Miro Cardona earlier spoke of doing away "with the 
formalities of nonintervention" and he added that Cuba must be freed 
by "the coordinated forces of all the nations of this continent." 
Many of the respected columnists have based their post-invasion 
analyses on the premise that Castro must be overthrown. Reston called 
it a requirement of "the self-interest of the nation." Shannon said 
"it would be in America's national interest." Sanguine Stuart Alsop put 
it: "Some day, one way or another, the American commitment to bring 
Castro down will have to be honored. The commitment can only be 
honored if the American government is willing, if necessary,, to strike 
to kill, even if that risks the shedding of American blood." 
To a visitor from Mars the dread fear of the richest nation in the 
world of a tiny island with a population less than New York City's might 
seem pathological. Clearly the invasion showed that all Cuba wants 
Castro. But, the logic says, we must overthrow him to protect our 
security. Our Martian might question the nature of Castro's threat. He 
might easily brush off the canard of Soviet missile bases off our shores by 
pointing out that aside from the fact that Khrushchev has disowned 
such designs in Cuba, a nation that has the rocket thrust to orbit a 
cosmonaut need not locate its bases under a potential adversary's nose. 
The more logical answer lies in the statement of an unidentified 
diplomat to the Wall Street Journul April 28: 'We might as well face 
it, Castro is no great threat to our security by himself; it's the danger 
of his doctrine spreading to other countries that's a threat to us." 
Our Martian might attribute vulgar motives to Washington officials 
because of their direct and covert ties to U.S. sugar and business inter- 
ests in Cuba, which were "intervened" by the Castro revolution. For 
example, Adolph Berle, until last February, was chairman of American 
Molasses Co., which got its sugar and molasses from companies form- 
erly in Cuba. The company's stock price rose to an all-time high at the 
time of the invasion. Berle's wife owns, and he is trustee for, $1,250,000 
worth of American Molasses stock. 
But we would divert our Martian from cynical thoughts and turn 
him toward the real lesson for the U.S. in Cuba. While we have been 
watching television, the Latin American campesino has been looking 
at his plight. He has decided that he is entitled to a fair share of what 
he produces and the Cuban revolution has shown him that he can get 
it and how to get it. 
The campesino7s emanicpation is no threat to the nation; it endangers 
only the spoilers, who have had their way too long. The Unitecl 
States can live in peace with the new campesino and it can do business 
with him. It can sell him goods at a fair price and buy his on similar 
terms. But the nation must accept that the day of the spoiler in the 
"banana republics" is gone. The campesino may choose political forms 
different from ours, but we must recognize that that, too, is his right 
and to challenge this right is to risk global holocaust. 
It is not easy for the spoiler who has fed so long high on the 
hog to settle for chittlings. But we must not allow his recalcitrance 
tp put the nation out of step with history. The real threat to national 
: security is allowing the spoiler to shape our policy. 
 loba all^ every day, we test whether great powers of unlike political 
and social systems can coexist. In Cuba, the question is whether a great 
power can survive the impertinence of a tiny neighbor's decisions 
to have economic self-determination. As the Soviet Union has survived 
reactionary regimes in Turkey and Iran on its borders, so the U.S. can 
survive agrarian reform in Cuba, even though it calls itself socialist. 
R - - . - rv 6-
from .Nis Hammartsroem i~ INy Dag, Stockholm 
"The tourist posters told us Cuba i s  the land of surprises!" 
VACUNA ANTIRRABICA, 
from Revolucion, Habana 
Anti-Ra bies Vaccination 
POSTSCRIPT 
from Revolution, Habana 
Another of our ~owerful  weapons. 
FOREIGN POLICY AFTER CUBA 
The humiliating defeat for the U.S. of Operation Pluto by the Cuban 
revolutionary forces has had, and is having, significant repercussions 
within the ruling power elite of the United States. The defeat was the 
sharpest expressLon of the failure of American foreign policy in the past 
decade, and it has resulted in an enraged feeling of frustration among 
the rulers of America. Frustration leads to bitter arguments. At an 
earlier time of frustration the late John Foster Dulles threatened his 
Western allies with an "agonizing reappraisal" of American commitments 
in Europe. It was a threat uttered at the wrong time, to the wrong 
people, for the wrong reasons, but it was a memorable phrase. In 
a fateful way, the phrase accurately fits the present dilemma of the 
Kennedy Administration as a result of the Cuban fiasco. Says The 
Reporter: 
"Cuba and Laos have done it: a debate on the ends and 
means of our foreign policy has started; the strategy and dip- 
lomacy of the nation are being publicly re-examined with 
feverish thoroughness ." 
Everybody is agonizing, though some agonize less than others, and 
two broad camps have shaped up. The less agonized camp, whose 
articulate and sober spokesmen are James Reston of the N. Y. T i m s  
and Walter Lippmann of the N.Y. Herald Tribune, holds that the balance 
of power in the world has shifted from U.S. preponderance to East-West 
equality and that our foreign policy must be drastically re-adjusted 
to this reality. 
The other camp, which is led by the CIA and the Pentagon, argues 
that Western power is still dominant but is not used ruthlessly enough. 
What is needed is to reinforce Dulles' policy of force; put a little more 
heat under the Cold War! Most U.S. press pundits-Max Lerner, Joseph 
Alsop, Marguerite Higgins, David Lawrence, Roscoe Drummond and 
so on-are in the second camp. There is however a lot of confusion among 
them as is natural among agnizers. 
Both camps claim President Kennedy as their own, the re-adjusters 
a little wistfully, the ruthless ones a little more confidently, since the 
President's utterances since the Cuban invasion have been quite belliger- 
ent. His first speech after the failure was an affirmation that the United 
States would intervene unilaterally in Latin America if he felt American 
national security was at stake. He has said that the East-West conflict 
is such that "no war has ever posed a greater threat to our security." 
He has declared, "every new piece of information, every fresh event, 
has deepened my conviction that the survival of our civilization is at 
stake-and the hour is late." 
Furthermore the main emphasis in foreign policy is still on military 
force. The enormous arms budget has been further increased. The 
ICBM and Polaris submarine programs have been accelerated and we 
- - 
have also stepped up the construction of medium-range missle batteries 
in England, Turkey and Italy. Most important, Kennedy has decided to 
increase rapidly the special units of the army for so-called guerrilla 
warfare. The appointment of General Taylor to head the inquiry into 
the CIA fiasco has a built-in verdict: take away the operations functions 
cf the CIA and give them to the Pentagon in order to strengthen and 
increase them. 
Guerrilla warfare is the new panacea of Kennedy-just as massive 
retaliation was that of John Foster Dulles. It is reported that Kennedy 
has been reading Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara's works on the sub- 
ject, and according to Hanson Baldwin of the N. Y. Times, Kennedy 
"has 'been impressed." The Army has .three Special Forces groups. 
Baldwin in the Times describes them thus: "The Seventh (or parentj 
Group now at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the Tenth in Germany and 
the First in Okinawa. . . . A further index of the emphasis on guerrilla 
and anti-guerrilla activities is the increase in rank from colonel to 
brigadier general given to the commanding officer of the Special 
Welfare Center at Fort Bragg. He is Col. William P. Yarborough. . . ." 
Baldwin explains that the outfit is expanding because of the speciai 
interest shown by President Kennedy himself. The Kennedy budget 
for 1962 requests 3,000 more men for the Special Forces, enough to 
more than double their strength. The outfit is aware of the Presidential 
interest and the men are calling themselves the President's Own. 
The sudden discovery of guerrilla warfare as a cure for the U.S. 
military problems has created a kind of euphoria which has influenced 
even such a sober paper as the Wall Street Jourwl. Under a headline 
U.S. ARMY TAKES TIP FROM REDS, STEPS UP GUERRILLA 
TRAINING, a special report is enthusiastic: 
"Here in the pine woods around Fort Bragg, a select group 
of volunteer soldiers is learning how to infiltrate a Communist 
country, arm and train anti-Red native bands, and then help 
these insurgent groups ambush convoys, disrupt communica- 
tions, raid supply lines and otherwise harass the enemy . . . 
"These rugged men, all volunteers for hazardous duty, 
train to survive and operate in swamps, jungles, deserts and 
mountains. . . . The Army claims these men could infiltrate Com- 
mdst-dominated lands by land, sea or aii; working perhaps up 
to 2,500 miles behind the Iron Curtain, they could organize 
sympathetic people into g u d a  bands to harass and under- 
mine the government. Initially the resistance movement would 
probably concentrate on subversion through strikes, rumors, 
riots; then as it picked up strength and firepower, the movement 
would chip away at industry, communications and supply, and 
government morale . . ." 
"Special Forces detachments can use such diverse weapons 
as a bow-and-arrow, an obsolete Thompson sub-machine gun, 
a Cuban developed M-16, a sawed-off shotgun that fires an 
incendiary gasoline bottle as much as 1,200 yards. . . . Each 
Special Force soldier must possess a number of skills: How 
to perform minor surgery, bag rattlesnakes to stave off starva- 
- tion, fire foreign weapons and win over natives at the grass- 
roots level." 
Unfortunately, there is a little problem which even the euphoric 
reporter could not miss: The problem of language. Our bow-and-arrow 
sharpshooters and rattlesnake-bagging guerrillas ".face a pitfall in their 
limited ability in language . . ; an obvious limitation in swaying native 
opinion and controlling guerrilla forces." But the Army doesn7t give 
up easily and' the officers see to it that the men learn a few hundred 
words of any language they may need. As one of them explained to the 
reporter, "if our men know 300 to 500 words and select phrases, they 
can show natives how to strip down a gun or plant a demolition bomb." 
One can only marvel at such monumental egocentricity and visualize 
our highly trained paratrooper knocking at the door of a Laotian 
peasant and drawing on his scant stock of words for the magic phrase 
that will open the door. 
The new American reliance on guerrilla warfare will prove illusory. 
The Kennedy Administration may read Mao Tse-tung, but it doesn't 
understand him. On June 4, 1961, under the headline "Mao's Primer 
on Guerrilla Warfare" the New York Times published extensive excerpts 
from Mao's manual (translated by the Marine Corps!) The opening 
sentences should make the Pentagon think: 
'Without a political goal, guerilla warfare must fail, as it 
must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspira- 
tions of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assist- 
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ance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus 
revolutionury in character. (Emphasis added.) 
"On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, 
there is no place for guerrilla hostilities because guerrilla warfare 
basically derives from the masses, and is supported by them." 
The Pentagon thinks it can make use of the techniques of guerilla 
warfare because it thinks in terms of equipment and training, of TNT 
and small radios, of Garand riflles and bows and arrows. But the decisive 
factor in guerrilla warfare, as Mao points out, is the political factor: 
what is the guerrilla fighting for? Always, in eve* case, the guerrilla is 
fighting for food and justice against oppressive social and economic 
systems, against landlords, usurers, corrupt officials and arbitrary police, 
in short the very things American foreign policy supports because it 
supports the status quo. 
The Pentagon's utilization of guerrilla warsfare, or as it is more 
formally called, paramilitary warfare will end up to be nothing more than 
hit and run commando raids and sabotage missions . . . plain gangsterism 
by the U.S. government. That this is no exaggeration is shown in a blunt 
article in the Wall Street Journal of May 16, 1961 which make this brutal 
statement about paramilitary warfare: "It is a doctrine which wuld 
concentrate on brutalities performed in the dark; honorable men of 
high rank now sit in this city (Washington) calmly discussing the pos- 
sibilities of such things as the methodical assassination of Communist 
leaders abroad." This is not a Steve Canyon comic strip; this is the 
Wall Street Jouml  reporting on high U.S. officials, and if there are any 
doubts it is not because of moral considerations but rather *opposition 
to all-out paramilitary ventures has centered within the government 
on purely practical considerations." One of these considerations is a 
rather important one, "By any realistic assessment, it would seem that if 
America tries to step up undercover competition with the Soviet, it 
must count on a 'paramilitary gap' that will make the 'missile gap' look 
trivial by comparison." 
By some kind of insane logic the failure of the Cuban invasion has 
strengthened the proponents of paramilitary action. We read in the 
article, "The idea that the U.S. Army must rely on undercover para- 
military techniques of warfare as one way to stop and reverse Red 
advances now appears more firmly established as national policy than 
it was before the recent resounding failure of the paramilitary invasion 
of Cuba . . . which attempted to cloak as a spontaneous rebellion of 
exiles an attack which was in fact fully sponsored and directed by the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency." But this logic is no longer insane 
when the Journul reveals why the Pentagon likes the idea, namely, the 
ability to use secrecy so that there are no controls over the Pentagon 
activities. "Any paramilitary program, large or small, can bypass estab- 
lished governmental mechanisms of review. An offensive involving vast 
stakes can be decided in secret by a few highly placed officials, then a 
executed without scanning by Congressional committees. Though the 
CIA has had its failures, its success in blazing this trail is complete." 
In other words the CIA has shown the Pentagon the technique of waging 
undeclared war without the knowledge or consent of Congress, and the 
Journal goes on to spell this out: "The tradition of an informed public, 
the Constitutional right of the Senate to advise on foreign policy and of 
Congress to declare war . . . seem in basic codict with paramilitarism." 
This paramilitary doctrine is clearly designed not to attack Moscow 
or Peking, but as an undercover police action to stop popular movements. 
It is the military doctrine which corresponds to the political doctrine 
expressed by Kennedy in his speech to the American Society of News- 
paper Publishers where he said that the struggle "is taking place every 
day, without fanfare, in thousands of villages and markets, day and night 
and in classrooms all over the globe. . . ." 
In these thousands of villages are hundreds of thousands of people 
who are sick and tired of their poverty and exploitation, and prepared 
to fight for their emancipation when they get socialist weapons. But it 
isn't the weapons that make the revolutionary movements, it's the people. 
The Pentagon can supply arms by the millions of dollars, as it did in 
Laos, but it cannot find'the people willing to fight to maintain the status 
quo. That this reality should escape the secluded, rigid Pentagon brass 
hats is understandable, but it is surprising that so intelligent and demo- 
cratic a person as Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt does not see it. She, too, 
is puzzled. "As you look around the world," she writes, "where the 
Russians have supplied arms and materials of war, it is a strange 
thing to find that the peoples who have received this aid seem to fight 
harder than those to whom we supply arms and materials of war. There 
must be a reason for this . . ." 
There is a reason, and it seems fairly obvious when one appraises the 
Algerians or the Viet Nam forces fighting the French army, the Angolese 
fighting the Portuguese, or the Cubans resisting American-trained in- 
vaders. The obvious can be called by name-colonialism, imperialism- 
but these are dirty words. "There must be a reason for this," says 
Mrs. Roosevelt, "and I think it would be well for us to ferret it out. 
Perhaps those to whom we give aid are not entirely sure they can trust 
us. Why those who take aid from Russia should be sure they can 
completely trust the Soviets is a mystery, but it is one for us to study." 
The fact is that those to whom we give aid do trust us: we give to 
oppressors. It is their oppressed peoples who don't trust us. one has 
only to call the roll, Chiang Kai-shek, Syngham Rhee, Batista, Franco 
and so on. This fact is so clear that in recent months commentators 
freely admit it and try to excuse it on the grounds that the alternative 
to reactionary regimes is Communism. For example William Shannon 
writing in the liberal New York Post on May 16, 1961 says: 
"The governments we back in some countries are gray, but 
the alternative is black. The Spain of General Franco is in many 
ways a very sad country, but there is not the hopelessness of 
Hungary, South Vietnam has its problems and the Ngo Diem 
government could do better, but there is nothing like the blood- 
shed and ruthlessness of Ho Chi Minh's rule in North Vietnam. 
"There is an unconscious moral jingoism in the view that the 
U.S. should insist upon better governments in the countries we 
are aiding. In some countries there is no alternative to existing 
ruling factions. . . . When it comes to the problems of corrup- 
tion and of social change, we must bear in mind how difFicult 
such matters are in our own country. The maintenance of 
honesty in the governments of New York and Chicago is a 
constant struggle. The achievement of social change in Alabama 
and Mississippi almost defies the reason and imagination of 
men of goodwill . . . 
"The question we must ask about a government is not wheth- 
er it is corrupt but whether it functions effectively. . . . In foreign 
affairs, social reform represents the utopian solution of liberals." 
These statements reflect attitudes that are widely held in the govern- 
ment by men who consider themselves realists. In fact these ideas are 
appalling se18f-deceptions. The cormption in the American "client" 
states (as Lippmann calls them) is not the corruption of a city govern- 
ment. It is the corruption of a nation, a corruption that is so enormous, 
widespread and tenacious that it stifles trade, industry, agriculture, 
all possibilities of economic growth. This is what makes for explosive, 
revolutionary conditions. To ask whether a corrupt government functions 
effectively is to beg the question: such governments seem to function 
until overthrown. Batista looked very powerful and effective until a 
couple of months before he was thrown out. By then it was too late. 
Reform in our client states is not a moral question; it is a question 
of achieving stable governmentt. supported by a majority of the popula- 
tion. This is difEc111t to achieve under the best of circumstances, but it 
becomes impossible if the position is taken that any reform will help 
Communism. 
Shannon's attitude that the choice is between reactionary govern- 
ments and Communism is predominant in our government circles and it 
is the root of our self-defeating foreign policy. This "either/or9' psychology 
closes the door to alternatives and was the essence of John Foster 
Dulles' policy. To Dulles the neutralism of India was offensive because 
all neutrality in the East-West struggle was a vote of no-confidence 
in the U.S. and therefore, for Dulles, a pro-Communist position. While 
the Kennedy Administration is more realistic about neutralism, the 
"either or" psychology is still powerful within it, particularly in the 
Pentagon. The English, who are our closest allies, look upon this 
attitude with dismay since it is a sure formula for diplomatic defeats. 
A clear statement of the British position is found in the London Observer, 
a conservative, pro-American newspaper. It said on April 30, 1961: 
"It would be comforting to believe that the Cuban adventure 
was an isolated blunder, partly inherited from the previous 
Administration. But all President Kennedy's speeches and actions 
since then, and in the reactions of the American press, suggest 
that this was not so. The Cuban intervention sprang from a 
particular view of the world which the President fully shares, 
which most Americans approve, and which at present sh(~rply 
dioicles the United States from most of her allies and from all 
the neutral ndions. 
"To a far greater extent that they would like to admit, our 
American friends are the prisoners of an ideology almost as 
narrow as that of the Communists and just as ferently believed. 
The American ideology equates capitalism not only with free- 
dqm but very nearly with virtue. The nationalization of an 
American company by a small nation seems to most Americans 
proof of a political sin so obvious as to require no further 
discussion. 
"To nearly all Americans, Communism is an evil as absolute 
as Nazism or as murder, and any one who questions this dogma 
must already be infected by the contagion. They decline to 
notice any difference between Khrushchev's Russia and Stalin's 
Russia. They ignore the case of Yugoslavia, where Communists 
have created a society which is independent of Russia and 
* which appears to less impassioned democrats morally no worse 
than the capitalist societies of Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal 
or Verwoerd's South Africa. Few Americans can conceive that 
a Laotian peasant might genuinely prefer the Pathet Loo to 
Prime Boun Oum, or that there is anythmg except misery in the 
Soviet Union. 
". . . This view of the world is a dangerously over-simplified. . . . 
one. Mr. Khrushchev makes no secret of his conviction that 
Communism will ultimately prevail and that he will do his best 
to help it. No one would deny that Communist techniques 
are dangerous and hard to counter. But Mr. Khrushchev also 
knows that technique is not enough; that outside the areas where 
the Russian and Chinese armies are dominant, Comnzunism can 
succeed only where the conditions faom it. The chief of these 
d i t i o n s  are well known to be poverty, backwardness, feudal- 
ism and oppression; but there are also external factors of great 
importance. 
"In Eastern Europe, for instance, Communism's greatest ally 
is fear of Germany. In the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, it is anti-colonialism. By direct intervention in would- 
be neutralist parts of the world, the West presses a still painful 
wound. Admittedly, it takes strong nerves not to intervene when 
a country is threatened by Communist subversion, but it may 
be the right course. If Britain had interoened in Iraq after 
General Kassem's revolution, Iraq would now be Communist." 
( Empharis added. ) 
No one can accuse the conservative British government of pro- 
Communism and Prime Minister Macmillan has a long record of anti- 
Soviet bias, so the tartness of British comment is not due to ideological 
differences but to the fact that American policies haoe actually aided 
Communimn7 a contention which is strongly and explicitly supported 
by Walter Lippmann who writes : 
". . . The reason we are on the defensive in so many places 
is that for some ten years we have been doing exactly what Mr. 
Khrwhchev expects us to do. We have used money and arms 
in a long losing attempt to stabilize native governments which, 
.in the name of anti-Communism, are opposed to all important 
. social change. 
"We cannot compete with Communism in Asia, Africa or 
Latin America if we go on doing what we have done so often 
and so widely-which is to place the weak countries in a dil- 
emma where they must stand still with us .and our client rulers, 
or start moving with the Communists ." 
The U.S.-Cuba relations of the last few years fit perfectly into the 
British and Lippmann analysis. The United States supported Batista 
with money and arms, opposing all social change, while major American 
utilities, sugar and oil companies derived huge profits. The fact of U.S. 
control over Batista is uncontested. One may say it has been certified 
by a qualified authority, Mr. Earl T. Smith, former U.S. Ambassador 
to Cuba, who told a Senate Committee: 
"Senator, let me explain to you that the United States, 
until the advent of Castro, was so overwhelmingly influential 
in Cuba that. . . the American Ambassador was the second most 
important man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than 
the President." 
Batista's army was equipped with American weapons and trained 
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by U.S. military men, who remained in Cuba even beyond the fall of 
Batista. In fact, they were sent home by Castro who explained politely 
that their services were not needed by the Cuban guerrillas and that - 
their competence, in view of ~atista's defeat was, to say the least, 
questionable. Despite U.S. support of Batista, when Castro won in 
January, 1959, he was not at all oriented to the socialist countries. There 
wasn't even a trade agreement with the Soviet Union for over a year. 
An intensely eclekc individual, Castro's only basic commitment 
was the agrarian reform which his guerrilla forces, predominantly 
p2asants, had been promised and now expected. But there was certainly 
at that time no immediate intention to nationalize U.S. companies. 
In fact, in the spring of 1959 Castro came to the U.S. to seek loans and 
economic help. He was turned down, and after he carried into effect the 
Agrarian Reform, the Eisenhower Administration began to put active 
economic obstacles in the way of Cuban trade. Nevertheless it was 
several months before Cuba turned to the socialist countries and in 
February, 1960, signed a trade agreement which included the purchase 
of Soviet oil at prices well below those of the monopoly-dominated 
world market. The big refineries (Standard of New Jersey, Texaco, Shell) 
refused to handle the oil and the Cuban government took over the 
refineries. This was in June, 1960, a year and a half after the victory 
of the Revolution. It was this event which triggered the chain reaction 
that led to the nationalization of all ~merican companies in Cuba. 
The monopolies thereupon cut off the flow of oil from Venezuela and 
Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for all its oil. . 
In July the U.S. government cancelled the sugar quota, a major 
blow of economic warfare, expected to cripple the Cuban economy. 
Cuba sold its sugar to the socialist countries and retaliated by nation- 
alizing the oil refineries, the US.-owned sugar mills, the U. S.-owned 
utilities. In October Washington imposed an embargo on exports and 
Cuba nationalized all the U.S. companies. All told, about one billion 
dollars of U.S. investments were taken over. The CIA stepped up its plans 
to prepare an invasion which was carried through in April, 1961. 
Several things must be noted. If there are Czech trucks on the 
Cuban highways and Soviet tankers in Habana harbor, it is because 
American companies have refused to sell U.S. trucks and U.S. oil to Cuba. 
U. S. policy of economic warfare deliberately destroyed the network 
of trade relations forcing Cuba to turn to the socialist countries for its 
machines, spare parts, technical training and so forth. 
Secondly, and as a consequence, the Cuban people began to get a 
new vie-int on socialism Bnd the socialist countries. The mass of 
people in Cuba have been influenced not so much by Cuba's small 
Communist Party as by the daily arrival of Soviet tankers into Cuban 
harbors. The entire Cuban ecokmy depends on oil as a source of 
energy and every Cuban knows how essential oil is to any activity. 
The white tankers with the hammer and sickle on their funnels are 
the most effective propaganda that could possibly be devised. 
Thirdly, while the nationalization of U.S. industries was part of the 
struggle against American economic warfare and was determined by 
American actions, yet this nationalization had an internal effect of 
strengthening the public sector of the Cuban economy, thus pushing 
Cuba further on the road to socialism. As sections of the upper middle 
class turned against the Castro government because of their economic 
and political ties with American interests, the Cuban government 
nationalized their holdings as well. Large sections of the upper classes 
defected to Miami and their defection further weakened the conservative 
forces inside Cuba. The ultimate result of U.S. enmity was that both the 
economic and the political basis of socialism was strengthened in Cuba 
and the opposition dispersed in the brief space of two years. The at- 
tempted invasion climaxed this development and it was after this 
fiasco that Castro spoke, of the revolution as patriotic, democratic, and- 
for the first time-socialist. 
The contention that American foreign policy forced the Cuban 
Revolution to take the socialist road has been challenged by friend 
and foe. Theodore Draper has argued that the break with the United 
States was desired by Castro and his friends and that they maneuvered 
skillfully so that the actions they wanted to do seemed to be reactions 
to American economic aggression. The least that can be said to this 
is that American foreign policy was terribly obtuse to give Castro 
the+'excuses he wanted. Yet Draper himse1.f admits that Castro's 
ideas were the ruling ideas of the Revolution and that at the beginning 
Castro did not have socialist solutions in mind. Draper at no time 
takes up the question of what would have happened had the United 
States accepted the Agrarian Reform and given Cuba the loans which 
Castro came looking for in the spring of 1959. 
The Monthly Review editors, Huberman and Sweezy, in their book 
and their articles have argued that, whether they knew it or not, the 
original objectives of the Cuban Revolutionists could only be achieved 
through socialism. Huberman has written: "Let me be clear. I am not 
saying that opposition by the U.S., of itself, forced the Revolutionary 
Government to move towards socialism-it served rather to speed up  
the process." Of course, everytlung revolves around that phrase "speed 
up." It can mean a year, a decade, or even half a century. The point 
simply is this: Had the United States accepted the Agrarian Reform 
*and1 provided loans, the nationalization would have been limited to a 
few key monopolies (oil, utilities, sugar mills ) which would have been 
compensated, but the smaller American and Cuban businesses would 
have been functioning, expanding, and finding the way to have a political 
platform and exercise political influence. It is beyond our scope at this 
time to examine this problem at length, and it is only touched upon 
here because it deals with the question of whether the U.S. could have 
pursued an alternate policy in its own c h s  interests, what the New York 
Times termed editorially "the engineering of a social and economic 
revolution by peaceful means." 
Whether such an alternative is feasible or not, no one knows. It 
hasn't been explored and of course it hasn't been tried. What is being 
tried is the policy of bolstering disintegrating regimes with American 
arms. The result can only be a series of colonial wars which will 
be as disastrous for the American nation as the Indo-China and Algerian 
conflicts have been for the French nation. It is evident by now that the 
American policy of clinging to a reactionary status quo and of attempting 
to turn the clock back has resulted in such resounding defeats in 
Cuba and now in Laos as well, that some sections of the American 
ruling class are beginning to take stock. In an editorial on May 14, 
1961, the New York Times stated: 
'We have too often encouraged communism by treating 
any anti-Communist government as a friend. The fact that Fidel 
Castro has been .able to build up an anti-United States, pro- 
Russia regime in Cuba is at least partly due to our tolerance of 
the arbitrary and corrupt Batista government which Castro 
overthrew. We should learn from this case and from others 
that we cannot successfully fight communism by subsidizing 
governments that rob or exploit their own people." 
A few days later, May 18, Walter Lippmann in a slashing attack on 
the continuation of the Dulles foreign policy, which he titled "A Dying 
Policy," analyzed the failure of this policy in the Far East, writing: 
"The revolution in Iran and the revolution in South Korea 
are warning signs . . . that it is not only in Laos that there is 
trouble for the American client states. 
'In Iran the revolution is a desperate attempt at the top, 
with the blessings of the Shah, to reform the regime before 
it is overthrown from below. . . . The hour is late in Iran. 
"In South Korea the revolution is the work of the Army . . . 
the new military government, although it is not anti-American 
intheory, is in fact defying and ignoring our embassy and the 
American army commander." 
"The revolutions in South Korea and Iran, following the dis- 
orders in Laos and South Vietnam, are a warning that in Asia 
the policy of containment by American satellite states is breaking 
down. In all four of these countries the governments have been 
our clients, indeed they 'have been our creations. All of them 
are crumbling, and in the last analysis they are all crumbling 
for the same reason . . . these American client states are not only 
corrupt but they are intolerably reactionary. 
". . . our present experience on the periphery of Asia is the 
American equivalent of what the British and the French are 
experiencing during the liquidation of their colonial empires. 
For what we are witnessing is the dissolution of the Dulles 
system of Asian protectorates. ( Emphasis added. ) " 
This is strong language indeed and a blunt statement of facts long 
hidden from the American people. That so respectable a commentator 
as Lippmann should talk about American satellites and the Dulles sys- 
tem of Asian protectorates in a context which equates American policy 
with British and French imperialism is a reflection of the urgency of the 
need for new foreign policy. The old foreign policy of Mr. Dulles, says 
Lippmann, has confirmed Mr. Khrushchev's belief "that a capitalist 
society cannot change, that in its dealings with the under-developed 
countries it can only dominate and exploit. It cannot emancipate and 
<< help." A new approach must be, says Lippmann, to make it our 
central and persistent and unswerving policy ' to offer these unhappy 
countries a third option, which is economic development and social 
improvement without the totalitarian discipline of Communism." 
In more cautious language the New York Times supports this 
position, editorializing: ". . . whether we like or or not we are living 
in a revolutionary period. . . . What we must do is to understand 
that we are living in a period of irrepressible change. We will have to 
broaden and deepen the principles of democracy. We will have to be 
tough with groups in other countries who would use foreign aid to 
promote their own interests and power." 
Whether or not such a new foreign policy could work is a moot 
question. Given the structure of American society it is a difficult, unex- 
plored question beyond the scope of this writing. Yet the necessity 
of making the attempt is clear to men like Lippmann and Reston, to 
institutions such as the New York Times. The immediate political 
problem, therefore, is to widen and deepen the debate between the 
re-adjusters and the standpatters, to isolate such powerful forces as 
Standard Oil and the Pentagon which will not budge a millimeter. 
Tigers do not want to eat grass. 
It is a gauge of the new cleavages created by this political diremma 
that certain liberal forces, blinded by anti-Sovietism, now support the 
most reactionary forces in America. Typical is Max Ascoli, editor of The 
Reporter, writing in the issue of May 25 a bitter editorial against 
Lippmann and Reston under the title "Foreign Policy After Cuba." 
Ascoli sees the desperate straits of American foreign policy, saying: 
"A great power enjoys a considerably broad margin for error. After 
Cuba, we have no margin." But his recipe is: more of the same, no 
readjustment, no negotiations, no disengagement. The next to last 
paragraph of his editorial is a blatant statement of the new Know- 
Nothingism. 
"The great post-Cuba debate will go on for a long time and 
any number of Clausewitzes are likely to suggest changes in our 
diplomacy as a result of what they consider our new strategic 
position. As far as we are concerned, to the now fashionable 
question of which country we should disengage ourselves from, 
our answer is: from none. And if it is asked which country we 
should like to have neutralized by a coalition government'with 
Communist participation, our answer is again : none." 
The forces opposing a re-examination and change in foreign policy 
are powerful indeed and not to be minimized. But these contemporary 
King Canutes have already suffered a major defeat in the very fact 
that a debate has begun, and, as Ascoli agrees, this debate will go 
on for a long time. It is our belief that events will force this debate 
to go deeper and deeper and to penetrate into all layers of the American 
population. The voices of reason will have to speak ever more clearly, 
ever more bluntly. They will have to reveal much of the truth of 
American diplomacy and foreign policy d the past decade, bring out 
facts which have been systematically hidden and falsified. 
Already, for example, ~ i p ~ m a n n  a d Reston have boldly stated the 
key fact of the post-Roosevelt foreign policy, namely that the atomic 
diplomacy of the U.S. initiated the Cold War. In the last fifteen 
years any such statement would have been immediately red-baited, for 
only the Left took such a position. 
Fifteen years ago when Churchill and Forrestal used the pliant 
Truman to start the Cold War, it was nearly impossible to find any 
politically respectable individual to state the truth of this matter. It 
took diligent research to get a quote like that of Summer Welles who 
wrote in 1946 concerning the Cold War that "the blame for the present 
disaster should be shared by the United States," or Elliot Roosevelt's 
statement in the same year that "it was the Unitedl States who &st shook 
the mailed fist." 
For 15 years such statements were tabu. To say that the Truman 
Administration, hypnotized by the atomic bomb, was primarily respon- 
sible for the Cold War, was to ask for trouble. But now, listen to 
James Reston: "Immediately after the war, when the United States 
had an atomic monopoly, it was in a position to enforce its will in 
areas close to the ~ommknist borders. It was then that the Government 
decided on a policy of halting expansion of Communism everywhere." 
Or listen to Lippmann, "They [the American people] have not been told 
hat the military situation which existed when John Foster Dulles 
established his policy no longer exists. They have not been told that 
he made it work by shaking the bomb at the Communists." 
To understand the origins of the Cold War is the beginning of 
wisdom in foreign policy. The overwhelming majority of the American 
people still have no idea of the struggle that went on in the Truman 
Cabinet over the issue of getting tough with the USSR; do not know 
that Stimson and Marshall as well as Henry Wallace disagreed with 
the policy of the Cold War. There is little knowledge in America that 
as early as September 1945 Stimson wrote a famous memorandum to 
President Truman warning against atomic diplomacy and saying 
L I 
w "I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with 
w 
1 Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated 
by the problems of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem 
of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally im- 
portant, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment 
of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could 
I afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery 
of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. Those rela- 
tions may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in 
which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. 
-. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue 
" to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously 
on our hip, their suspicions and distrust of our motives will 
increase." 
The American people still do not know that as early as 1946, in 
uman's first Administration, John Foster Dulles was busy behind 
scenes in the State Department. William L. Shirer reported in 
e of 1946 that "Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes, green as they are in 
reign affairs, have taken over so many ideas of Mr. Dulles, especially 
regard to Russia." In sum, Dulles planted the seed of the Cold 
ar at that time. 
The Dulles policy of the Cold War, introduced via Truman and 
ntinued by Eisenhower, has brought the United States from is apex 
of world power and prestige in 1945 to the low of 1961. It has been a 
disastrous policy not only for the broad national interests of the Amer- 
ican people, but also for the narrower class interests of the ruling 
groups themselves, and it is for this reason that in the last few years 
differences of opinion have been growing sharper among policy makers, 
erupting into the present "great debate." The wiser heads among the 
power elite would like to make the necessary adjustments but they are 
in a minority and can only achieve their aim if they can muster 
broad popular support within the American people. 
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It is in this context that the necessity arises of informing the public 
of the truths of the past decade. The New York Times, Reston, Lippmann, 
Kennan and others are finding it necessary to speak clearly enough so 
that all may understand them and to point out the obvious results of 
atomic diplomacy. Today this policy is in ruins and when Lippmann 
attacks the policy he has to say why it was made and how it failed. He 
writes as follows on Asia, but his words are applicable all over the world: 
"The Kennedy Administration did not form the policy of 
of setting up on the periphery of Asia a semi-circle of American 
military clients. But it is now confronted with the breakdown 
of that policy, with the disorders, the dangers, and the pains 
of having to pick up the pieces. This is an experience which the 
American people have never had before and it is one for which 
their lead&s &ve not prepared them. They have not been told by 
anyone in authority that there has been a radical change in the 
military situation and what the consequences of that change are. 
They have not been told that the military situation which 
existed when John Foster Dulles established this policy no 
longer exists. They have not been told that he made it work by 
shaking the bomb at the Communists. That is why so many 
of them suppose that Mr. Kennedy can make it work with a 
few Marines and by shaking his fist. 
"Our moral and intellectual unpreparedness for the reality of 
things is causing widespread demoralization among us. We must 
not let ourselves be overcome by it." 
The American people are demoralized because they have been lied 
to by their own government, lied to persistently and systematically. 
So much has this been the case that the New York Times, which has 
not been wholly blameless, published its stinging enditorial, THE RIGHT 
NOT TO BE LIED TO. 
Cuba has brought out into the open a debate which has been 
going on among the power elite in the privacy of their offices, homes 
and clubs. This debate is a reflection of the struggle over a change 
in foreign policy, a struggle which will become sharper under pressure 
of international events. More and more people will be drawn into this 
struggle, more and more the truth will be out about the Cold War. 
It is our profound conviction that in the next few years great political 
struggles will take place in our country to take American foreign 
policy out of the hands of the CIA, the Pentagon, the armaments 
corporations and the political diehards. In such an eventuality we 
may look back to the Cuban fiasco as a turning point in international 
affairs, and the American people may finally see the Cuban Revolution 
as an essential step in achieving their own democratic fulfillment. 

T HE AUTHORS have gathered and 
analyzed all the material available 
on the attempted invasion of Cuba in 
April 1961, paying particular attention 
to the systematic misinformation and 
deception of the American public by 
government agencies and government 
officials of the highest rank. The decep- 
tion was so blatant that the usually 
restrained New York Times published 
a blistering editorial entitled THE 
RIGHT NOT TO BE LIED TO. 
The Cuban invasion was organized and 
executed by the Central Intelligence 
Agency under Allen Dulles. A summary 
view of the CIA and its director is given 
so that the Cuban invasion may be 
seen in its proper perspective as one of 
many similar operations-Iran, Guate- 
mala, Burma-in which the CIA has been 
engaged without the knowledge of the 
American people. 
The failure of the Cuban invasion has 
had, and is having, profound repercus- 
sions on American foreign policy and 
has precipitated a debate as to its 
future course. The importance of this 
debate cannot be minimized, and the 
authors have added as a postscript a 
chapter entitled Foreign Policy After 
Cuba, which brings to the reader some 
of the pros and cons of the arguments 
now current. 
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